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URGENT COMPASSION: MEDICAL
MARIJUANA, PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION AND THE MEDICAL
NECESSITY DEFENSE
Abstract: For centuries physicians and patients have extolled the medical
benefits of marijuana. The federal government, however; refuses to retreat
from its dogged war on drugs, preventing those in serious medical need
from realizing marijuana's therapeutic potential. Numerous states have
shown their opposition to the federal government's position, as well as their
compassion for the seriously ill, lry' placing pro-medical marijuana initia-
tives on their election ballots or by introducing such legislation in their state
legislatures. Furthermore, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has recently rendered two landmark decisions holding that the com-
mon law medical necessity defense is available to medical marijuana defen-
dants who are criminally prosecuted under federal law, despite the federal
government's general marijuana prohibition. Because a change in federal
drug policy is unlikely in the near future, one way federal prosecutors can
avoid this conflict with the federal judiciary, as well as respect the will of
the people in states that have passed pro-rnedical marijuana laws, is to exer-
cise appropriate prosecutorial discretion, refusing to prosecute medical mari-
juana patients. This especially should be the case in states where the citizens
have clearly expressed their values regarding medical marijuana through
the initiative or legislative process.
INTRODUCTION
Countless people suffering from an array of serious illnesses have
discovered the medical benefits of marijuana. Harris Taft is one of
those people) Harris was diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease. Follow-
ing an operation in which his spleen and affected lymph glands were
removed through an incision that ran from his pelvic bone to his
chest, Harris began what would become a decade of aggressive anti-
cancer treatments, primarily chemotherapy. Within ninety minutes of
I See LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA, THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE
32,-35 (rev. ed. l997). Lester Grinspoon, M.D. is an associate professor of psychiatry at
Harvard Medical School, and James B. l3akalar is a lecturer in law in the department of
psychiatry at Harvard Medical School. The following story is derived from an account of
Harris Tafi's wife. See id.
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his first chemotherapy session, Harris began to vomit violently and
continued vomiting for hours. When he had vacated everything irr his
stomach, he began to dry heave. Harris would be forced to endure
similar reactions after each of his subsequent treatments. Even when
his vomiting subsided, usually a day or so later, Harris remained so
nauseated that he could not eat—in fact, he could not even stand the
site or smell of food. His physician prescribed a number of drugs to
temper the vomiting and nausea, but none was effective.
Finally, after seven years of treatment, Harris was unable to toler-
ate any more of the pain and suffering associated with his treatment.
Moments before one of his chemotherapy sessions, Harris fled the
hospital. He confided in his wife that he had come to fear the treat-
ment more than the cancer, or even death itself. He went so far as to
say that he would choose death over any further chemotherapy.
Following the suggestion of a nurse and the tacit recommenda-
tion of his doctor, Harris began smoking marijuana to relieve the nau-
sea and vomiting. Although skeptical at first, Harris found that smok-
ing marijuana led to a profound improvement in his quality of life.
Indeed, for the first time in seven years, he was able to sleep through
the night peacefully. No vomiting. No nausea. He also regained his
appetite and put on much of the weight he had lost. Furthermore,
whereas Harris used to require weeks to recover from chemotherapy,
he was now ready to go to work after only forty-eight hours. As a result
of smoking marijuana, Harris' mood, manner and overall outlook
were transformed for the better. Moreover, in the two years in which
Harris used marijuana, he never had an adverse or unfavorable reac-
tion to it.
As noted above, Harris' experience with marijuana is not an
anomaly. Currently, however, it is impossible for someone in Harris'
position to use marijuana for medical purposes legally. Although a
number of states permit the medical use of marijuana under state law,
those who choose to use marijuana are not immune from prosecution
under federal law. 2
 Federal law reflects the proposition that medical
marijuana has no accepted medical uses As a result, the federal gov-
ernment claims that those charged with possession of marijuana tin-
der federal law are not entitled to assert a well-settled, common law
defense otherwise available to those forced by necessity to violate the
2 Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1997) (permitting medical
marijuana for seriously ill under stale law), with 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000) (detailing prohib-
ited acts regarding narcotics tinder federal law).
3 See Schedules of Controlled Substances, 21 U.S.C. § 812 (b) (I) (13) (2000).
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law—medical necessity or "choice of evils." 4 Fueled largely by igno-
rance and the "war on drugs," the federal government is unlikely to
change its laws with respect to marijuana or to retreat from vigorous
prosecution of those laws, even in cases where the substance is being
used for medical purposes. Therefore, for these innocent casualties of
the war on drugs, the medical necessity defense represents the only
chance to escape criminal sanctions and to continue using marijuana
to ease their symptoms. This conflict between the federal government
and those states that have chosen to allow the medical use of mari-
juana is highlighted by cases pending in the federal courts in Califor-
nia, and may eventually. be resolved by the United States Supreme
Court.5
Part 1 of this Note briefly examines the rise and fall of marijuana
as a legitimate form of medicine. 8 Part II examines the current efforts
being made at the federal and state level to make medical marijuana
available to the seriously ill. 7 Part III describes the development of the
medical necessity defense and its application to medical marijuana. 8
Part IV highlights the growing conflict between federal law and state
law pertaining to medical marijuana as evidenced by recent cases in
federal court in California. 9 Part V discusses the purpose of prosecu-
torial discretion and outlines the considerations _ that should be
weighed by federal prosecutors in deciding whether to initiate or de-
cline prosecution." Finally, Part VI suggests that the federal govern-
ment must structure its policies so as to uphold the will of the people
with respect to medical marijuana, and that the courts must be free to
exercise their independent discretion by allowing juries to hear ar-
guments of medical necessity as a valid defense to prosecution."
I. HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA
Today, marijuana is one of the most widespread and diversified of
plants. 12 Native to central Asia, the first evidence of the medical use of
4 See infra notes 156-261 and accompanying text.
5 See id.
° See infra notes 12-44 and accompanying text.
T Sec infra notes 44-98 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 99-155 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 156-261 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 262-96 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 297-375 and accompanying text.
12 See U.RINSPOON & BAKÁLAR, supra note 1, at 1. The fiber is used for cloth and paper
and was the most important source for rope before the development of synthetic fibers.
The seeds are used as bird teed and human food. The oil contained in the seeds was at one
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marijuana was published during the reign of the Chinese Emperor
Chen Nung more than five thousand years ago," In the West, how-
ever, marijuana's medical properties were not realized until much
later." By the mid-nineteenth century, physicians in the United States
were using marijuana for a wide variety of medical purposes, and be-
tween 1840 and 1900, over one-hundred journal articles on the medi-
cal use of marijuana were published." In the twentieth century,
moreover, physicians find marijuana to be an effective treatment for a
range of ailments, including: nausea and vomiting associated with
chemotherapy; weight loss associated with AIDS; glaucoma; epilepsy;
muscle spasms and chronic pain in cases of multiple sclerosis, quadri-
plegia and other spastic disorders; migraines; severe pruritus; and de-
pression and other mood disorders. 16 In addition, physicians find
marijuana useful in treating asthma, insomnia, dystonia, scleroderma,
Crohn's Disease and diabetic gastroparesis."
The zeal of physicians in the United States was tempered greatly
by the enactment of the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 ("the 1937 Actn). 18
Under the 1937 Act, persons using marijuana for any purpose were
required to register and pay a tax. 19 Those who failed to comply with
the Act were subject to large fines or time in prison for tax evasion. 20
Although the Act was intended to prevent non-medical use, its practi-
cal effect was to make marijuana difficult to obtain, and it ultimately
led to marijuana's removal from the United States Pharmacopoeia. 21
In 1970, following a rise in the recreational use of marijuana,
Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention
time used for lighting and soap, and is now used in varnish, linoleum and artists' paint. See
irl,
13 See id. Marijuana was recommended	 malaria, constipation, rheumatic pains, "ab-
sentmindedness" and "female disorders." See id.
14 See id. at 4,
15 See id. (citing MARIJUANA: MEDICAL PAPERS, 1839-1972 (T i !. Mikuriya ed., 1973)).
10 See generally Marcia Tiersky, Continent, Medical Marijuana: Putting the Power 117tere it
Belongs, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547.552-63 (1999).
11 See generally GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, s u m Hone 1, at 163-222.
18
 See GtuNsPooN & BAKALAR. supra note I , at 7. Fm' a discussion of the details sur-
rounding the enactment of the 1937 Act, see DAvm. R. FORD, MARIJUANA: Nor GUILTY AS
CHARGED, 61-64 (1997). For an excellent review of marijuana's criminalization generally,
see Richard J. Bonnie & Charles 11. Whitebread, II, The Forbidden Fruit of the Tree of Knowl-
edge: An Inquiry Into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REV. 971
(1970).
19 See Marijuana Tax Act, Id.R. 6385, 76th Gong. (1937).
20 See id.
21 See Lester Crinspoon, Medical Marijuana in a Time of Prohibition, 10 Itnretl. DRUG
Poi. 145, 147 (1999) [hereinafter Grinspoon, Time of Prohibitionb
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Control Act, also called the Controlled Substances Act, ("the Act"). 22
The Act assigned psychoactive drugs to five categories according to
their abuse potential, known effect, harmfulness and level of accepted
medical use. 25 Marijuana was placed in Schedule I, the most restrictive
category, which includes those drugs—such as LSD and heroin—that
are said to have a high risk of abuse and no currently accepted medi-
cal use. 24 Evidence suggests that Congress intended to place mari-
juana in Schedule I only temporarily, and thus meekly accepted this
classification in anticipation of a change after all the facts were in. 25
The decision to place marijuana in Schedule I was marked by vigor-
ous debate pertaining to who should be responsible for the factual
determination of marijuana's benefit as well as to the underlying so-
cial issues implicated by its claSsification. 28 Congress therefore de-
ferred the consideration of marijuana's medical utility pending the
outcome of studies commissioned by the Presidential Commission on
Marijuana and Drug Use ("the - Commission"). 27 The results of the
Commission, chaired by Raymond Shafer, 28 focused primarily on
marijuana's lack of dangerousness and recommended dramatic re-
ductions in the legal penalties associated with marijuana. 29 Because
the results were released at a time when both Congress and the Nixon
Administration were deeply embroiled in the "Watergate Scandal,"
22 .SreControlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-41 (2000).
23 See 21 U.S.C. § 812(1)) (I).
21 Schedule I placement requires findings that: (A) the chug or other substance has a
high potential for abuse; (II) the drug or other substance has no currently accepted medi-
cal use in treatment in the United States; (C) there is a lack of accepted safety or use of the
drug or other substance, under medical supervision. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (1) (B).
25 See RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. 1NHITEBREAD, II, THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION
246 (1999),
26 For an excellent treatment of this debate and its social implications, see BONNIE &
WHEFEBREAD, II, supra note 25, at 223-95.
27 See id. at 297. Indeed, the Committee report on the House liill regarding scheduling
recommended "that marijuana be retained in Schedule I at least until the completion of
studies now underway . The recommendations of this Commission will be of aid in
determining the appropriate disposition of tins question in the future." See 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4573,4579.
"See BONNIE & WiirrEuttEAD, II, supra note 25, at 247. Raymond Shafer, a former Re-
publican governor of Pennsylvania, was selected by President Nixon to chair the commis-
sion.
29 See id. (citing COMMISSION ON MARIJUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIJUANA: A SIGNAL
FOR MISUNDERSTANDING; FIRST REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIJUANA
AND DRUG ABUSE 145-54 (1972)). [hereinafter MARIJUANA: A SIGNAL FOR IthsuNDEtt-
STANDING]. The report tuned that marijuana was demonized because it symbolized the
"countercultitre," not because it had any negative physiological effects. See id.
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however, neither group took the necessary actions to reschedule mari-
juana. ,
In 1972, the. National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana
Laws (NORML) petitioned the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs (now the Drug Enforcement Agency) ("DEA") to reschedule
marijuana as a Schedule II drug, which includes those drugs that have
a high potential for abuse, but, unlike those in Schedule I, also have a
currently accepted medical use. 3° On September 6, 1988, after over a
decade of litigation, the DEA finally held public hearings on the issue
before the DEA's Chief Administrative Law Judge, Judge Francis L.
Young 51
 Judge Young issued the following opinion:
Marijuana, in its natural form, is one of the safest therapeu-
tically active substances known. [T] he provisions of the
[Controlled Substances] Act permit and require transfer of
marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule II. It would be un-
reasonable, arbitrary and capricious for DEA to continue its
stand between those sufferers and the benefits of this sub-
stance. 32
The DEA subsequently rejected Judge Young's ruling, 33
 and on Feb--
ruary 18, 1994, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit upheld the DEA's categorization of marijuana as a Schedule I
drug. 34
Notwithstatkding NORML's historic—and ultimately unsuccess-
ful—effort to require the DEA to reschedule marijuana as Schedule
II, demand for the legalization of medical marijuana on the part of
patients and physicians finally forced the Federal Drug Administra-
tion ("FDA") to approve the use of marijuana as a medicine in 1976,
a') See Allison L. Bergstrom, Medical Use of Marijuana: A Look at Federal & State Responses
to California's Compassionate Use Act, 2 DEPAul, J. HEALTH CARE L. 155, 164 (1997) (citing
Denial of Marijuana Scheduling Petition, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,767, 53.773 (1989)). Schedule II
placement requires findings that: (A) the drug or other substance has a high potential for
abuse; (B) the drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in treatment
in the United States or a currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions; (C) abuse
of the drug or other substance may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence.
21 U.S.C. 812(b) (2).
3 ISee Bergstrom, supra note 30, at 164.
32 See In re Marijuana Rescheditling Petition, No. 86-22, Opinion, Recommended Ruling,
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision of Administrative Law Judge, Washing-
ton, D.C.: Drug Enforcement Administration (1988).
33 See Bergstrom, supra note 30, at 164.
54 See Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Agency, 15 F.3d 1131,




by instituting the Individual Treatment Investigational New Drug Pro-
grain (or Compassionate Use IND program) ("the IND Program")."
Under the IND Program, physicians could obtain an Investigational
New Drug application ("IND") that would enable a patient to receive
marijuana for medical purposes. 36 This program was so bureaucrati-
cally burdened by federal law, however,37 that in its history, only three
dozen patients received marijuana through the IND Program; only
eight are currently participating." Indeed, in response to a growing
number of requests for admittance to the federal IND Program as a
result of the AIDS epidemic, it was suspended by the Bush administra-
tion in 1992, thereby limiting treatment to those enrolled in the IND
Program prior to 1992. 39 The IND Program remains suspended today
with no additional patients admitted since 1992.49
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, states took matters into their
own hands with thirty-four states enacting legislation making mari-
juana legal for medical use.'" Because marijuana is not recognized as
medicine under federal law, states can only dispense it by creating
formal research programs and getting FDA approval for an IND ap-
plication.42 Ultimately, these laws proved too difficult to implement as
the paperwork required by federal regulation was more than the phy-
sicians and administrators involved could manage. 43 The operational
costs of these state programs has thus led to their demise. 44
35 See GRINSPOON BAKALAR, supra note 1, at 20.
36 See id. at 20-22.
37 See id. at 21. The application process; alone, took four to eight months.
38 See id. at 22.
39 See id. James 0. Madison, Chief of the Public Illealth Service under President Bush,
stated that the program undermined the administration's anti-drug policy:
If it is perceived that the Public Health Service is going around giving mari-
juana to folks, there would be a perception that this stuff can't be so bad. It
gives a bad signal. I don't 
But
 helping people if there is no other way of
helping these people ....  there is not a shred of evidence that smoking
marijuan•assists a person with AIDS.
See id.
40 See GRINSPOON & - BAKALAR, supra note 1, at 22.
41 See id. at 17.
'12 See id.
43 See id. at 17; see also Grinspoon, Time'of Prohibition, supra note 21, at 2.
'It See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 1, at 22.
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II. CURRENT STATUS OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA
Efforts are being made at the federal level to facilitate the medi-
cal use of marijuana. Representative Barney Frank of Massachusetts
has reintroduced a bill that would reschedule marijuana as a Schedule
H drug.45 The bill provides that neither the Controlled Substances Act
nor the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall prohibit the pre-
scription, recommendation, use, production or distribution of mari-
juana by a physician for medical use so long as the patient meets the
relevant state standards. 46
 The bill is currently in the House subcom-
mittee on Health and the Environment. 47
Although it is unlikely that Congress will reschedule marijuana as
a Schedule II drug in the near future, the federal government has
displayed an increased interest in medical marijuana research. The
National Institutes of Health ("NIH"), for example, has shown some
willingness to explore the medical uses of marijuana. 48 On September
18, 1997, the NIH granted Donald Abrams, M.D. funds to study mari-
juana's safety as a medicine for people with AIDS.49 ,This represents
the first U.S. clinical trial in fifteen years to compile data on the
medical use of marijuana. 50 Since 1994, Dr. Abrams had tried to ob-
tain government permission to study the efficacy of medical mari-
juana, but the NH-I would only allow the study to proceed if its focus
was changed from efficacy to safety.51 Nonetheless, if the study deter-
mines that the safety risks to AIDS sufferers are negligible, it may well
lead the way for studies in the future focusing on marijuana's
efficacy.52
45 SeeMedical Use of Marijuana Act, H.R. 912, 106th Cong. § 2(a) (1999).
46 See id. §§ 2-3.
47
 H.R. 912 was referred to the subcommittee on March 16, 1999. See Bill Status and
Summary for H.R. 912 (visited Mar. 29, 2000) <http://thomasioc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
th1106:11.r.00912>. Representative Frank proposed a similar bill in the previous session of
Congress, H.R. 1782, but it did not receive the support necessary to pass. See Bill Summary
and Status fur the 105th Congress (visited Mar. 29, 2000) <littp://thomas.loc.gov/
bss/d105query.html>.
48 See Marijuana Policy Project, Government Finally Allows Marijuana for-AIDSStudy (vis-
ited Mai -. 29, 2000) <lutp://wwwmpp.org/abrams98.1find > [hereinafter AIDS StudyJ. The
National Institutes of Health is comprised of twenty-five separate Institutes and Centers
and is one of eight health agencies that is part of the U.S. Department of Health and Hu-




u See Lester Grinspoon & James B. Bakalar, Marijuana, the AIDS Wasting Syndrome, and
the U.S. Government, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 670 (1995).
52 See AIDS Study, supra note 48.
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Further support for medical marijuana research came in January
1997, when the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy
("ONDCP") commissioned the Institute of Medicine ("IOM"), an arm
of the National Academy of Sciences, to conduct a review of the sci-
entific evidence surrounding the medical use of marijuana." The goal
of the study was to assess the potential health benefits and risks of
marijuana and its constituent cannabinoids in order to assist the fed-
eral government in developing its policy on medical marijuana. 54
March 1999, the IOM released its report in a book entitled "Mari-
juana and Medicine: Assessing the Science Base," which determined
that marijuana's active components are potentially effective in treat-
ing pain, chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting, the anorexia
of AIDS wasting and other symptoms. 55 The report, therefore, urged
the federal government to make a commitment to getting new medi-
cal marijuana research under way to help identify marijuana's medi-
cally active compounds and to deliver the benefits to patients." In the
meantime, the IOM recommended that the federal government open
a "compassionate-use" program, similar to the one suspended by the
Bush administration in 1992, to give seriously ill people immediate
legal access to marijuana." The report also answered two controver-
sial questions concerning medical marijuana policy: whether legaliz-
ing medical marijuana would send the wrong message to children
about marijuana use generally and whether marijuana causes people
55 See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MARIJUANA AND
MEDICINE: ASSESSING TIDI SCIENCE BASE 1 (1999).
54 See id.
55 See generally id. at 138-80. The report slates that for those suffering from the above-
stated conditions, "ICIannabinoid drugs might offer broad-specirmn relief nut found in
any other single medication." Id. at 170.
56 See id, at 125-26.
57 See id. The report states:
Until a non-smoked, rapid-onset cannabinoids drug, delivery system beconies
available, we acknowledge that there is no clear alternative for people suffer-
ing from chronic conditions that might be relieved by smoking marijuana
One possible approach is to treat patients as n-of-1 clinical trials (single-
patient trials) ....
See id. at 126. The federal gOVer11111C111 "cOmpassionai e-use" program is all example of a n-
of-1 study. See Marijuana Policy Project, Questions about Medicinal Marijuana Answered ky 11w
Institute of illedkine's mport (1999) (visited Mar. 29, 2000) <http://ww.mpp.org/science.
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to use more dangerous drugs. 58 The report concluded that there is no
sufficient evidence to support either claim.59
On May 21, 1999, in response to the IOM's report and a general
need for more openness and clearer guidelines, the Department of
Health and Human Services ("DHHS") released its "Guidelines on
Procedures for the Provision of Marijuana for Medical Research,"
which took effect December 1, 1999.° Under the new guidelines, the
National Institute on Drug Abuse ("NIDA"),61 is able to sell govern-
ment marijuana to privately funded scientists whose research propos-
als have been approved. 62
 Previously, only scientists with federal grants
had access to this marijuana, but under the DHHS guidelines, pri-
vately funded researchers now are able to obtain government mari-
juana for "scientifically valid investigations" reviewed and approved by
the NIH. 65 Although most medical marijuana advocates believe that
the new DHHS guidelines are an improvement over existing policies,
they note that the guidelines contain numerous impediments to
medical marijuana research and neglect the issue of providing legal
58 See generally NATIONAL. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note
53, at 83-136. The second question refers to the theory that marijuana is a ''gateway drug;"
once consumed, marijuana will lead to the use of harder drugs, such as cocaine or heroin.
See Nicole Dogwill, Comment, The Burning Question: Howll'ill the United States Deal with the
Medical Marijuana Debate?, 1998 DET. C.L. REV. 247, 286-87. This gateway theory has been
one of the cornerstones of the prohibition on less addictive drugs like marijuana. See id.
59 See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, Slipla note 53, at 125-
36. As to the question regarding the message sent to children, the report stated: "[T1here
is no evidence that the medical marijuana debate has altered adolescent's perceptions of
the risks associated with marijuana use." Id. at 104. As to the second question, the report
stated that "there is no evidence that marijuana serves as a stepping stone on the basis of
its particular psychological effect." Id. at 99. Similarly the report rejected the claim that
there was a causal link between marijuana use and subsequent abuse of other illicit drugs,
stating that, "[Marijuana] does not appear to be a gateway drug to the extent that it is the
cause or even that it is the most serious predictor of serious drug abuse ...." See id. at 101.
€4 See National I nst it utes of Heal! h, A rmaouncernerrt of the Department of Health and Human
Services Guidance on Procedures for the Provision of Matijuana for Medical Research (1999) (vis-
ited Mar. 29, 2000) Chttp://grants.nih.gov/grams/guide/notice-Illes/not99-091.1und >
[hereinafter NI I-I, Announcement of Guidelines].
61
 The National Institute on Drug Abuse ("NIDA"), a component of the National Insti-
tutes of Health, oversees the cultivation of research-grade marijuana on behalf of the
United States government. Government marijuana is grown on a small plot of land by the
University of Mississippi under contract with NIDA. See Paul Recer, US Moves 'Award Mari-
juana Research, AssourATED PREss, May 22, 1999, at 1.
62 See id.




access to marijuana for patients in need. 64 Indeed, the guidelines ex-
plicitly reject the IOM's recommendation that the federal govern-
ment open a compassionate-use , program, allowing seriously ill ,pa-
dents to apply for permission to use medical marijuana. 65 .
The federal government's increased interest in medical mari-
juana research conies in the wake of recent public opinion polls that
indicate overwhelming support for the medical use of marijuana. 66
Public support is further evidenced by the trend among voters to sup-
port ballot initiatives that remove criminal penalties under state law
for seriously ill people who grow or possess medical marijuana. 67 In
1998, citizens in four states and the District of Columbia ("District of
Columbia" or "D.C.") passed ballot initiatives that—either by statute
or constitutional amendment—permit doctors to prescribe marijuana
61 See Marijuana Policy Project, • Suggsted Revisions to the HI-1S Medicinal Marijuana Re-
search Guidelines (visited Mar. 29, 2000) Chttp://www.mpp.org/lths-rev.html >. Marijuana
Policy Project proposes the following revisions to the HEIS guidelines:
(1) the FDA should be the sole federal agency—along with an Institutional
Review Board—id determine whether a proposed study is scientifically meri-
torious; (2) MIS should not place! limitations on medicinal marijuana re-
search beyond those that would. be placed on the study of new synthetic
drugs; (3) HLIS should not discourage researchers from conducting studies
with the goal of getting natural marijuana approved; and (4) a limited supply
of marijuana should not be used as a reason to influence or reject medicinal
marijuana study protocols; HI-IS should insure that NIDA grows a sufficient
amount of research-grade marijuana:
See id.
65 See NUL A nnouncement of Guidelines, supra note 59 (stating intention to focus on
multi-patient clinical studies, thus rejecting IOM'S recommendation in favor of single-
patient clinical studies); .see also Greg Scott & Barbara Douglass et al., Pain or Prison?, WASH.
Post, Jan. 12, 2000, at A19.
66 See National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), Medical
Marijuana Polls 1995-1999 (visited Mar.' 28, 2000) Chttp://www.norml.org/medical/
polls.slitml>. The NORML Web site lists, for example, Gallop Poll, March 1999 (73% of
Americans support making marijuana available to doctors so that they may prescribe it);
CNN Interactive Poll, April 1999 (96% of 'respondents said they support the use of rani-
juana for medical purposes); Journal of American Medicine Association poll, conducted
by _Harvard School of Public Health, March 1998 (60% of respondents supported allowing
physicians to prescribe medical marijuana); ABC News National Poll, conducted by Chilton
Research Company, May 1997 (69% of respondents favored legalizing medical use of mari-
juana). See id.
67 Since 1996, initiatives allowing for the medical use of marijuana have been placed
on ballots in Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, Washington and the
District of Columbia. See DRUG POLICY FOUNDATION, ELECTION '98: THE VOTE FOR MEDI-
CAL MARIJUANA AND DRUG POLICY REFORM 5 (1998) (offering in-depth description of
1998 ballot initiatives).
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for seriously ill patients who would benefit from such treatment. 68
Since the elections, however; only three states •
 have actually passed
laws that codify the initiatives. 69
 Additionally, in 1996, voters in Cali-
fornia and Arizona voted in favor of similar initiatives."
Although the initiatives differ somewhat, they share a number of
important elements:71
 All of the initiatives include provisions that ei-
ther give patients and caregivers an affirmative defense in state court
if they demonstrate medical need," or specifically exempt them from
68
 The states were Alaska, Nevada, Oregon, 'Washington and the District of Columbia.
See id. Colorado had a sufficient number of signatures to place a medical marijuana initia-
tive on its 1998 ballot, but the votes were not counted because .a state court subsequently
held that a number of the signatures were invalid. See Tiersky, supra note 16, at 583 (citing
Medical Marijuana Bath on in 2000?, Am. POLL. NETWORK, Dec. 11, 1998).
69 See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.71, 17.37 (Michie 1999); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475.300-475.346
(1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANNI-§ 69.51A (West 2000). Voters approved the Nevada initia-
tive, which amends the Nevada constitution to permit the possession and use of marijuana
for medical purposes. See Ballot Question 9 (visited Mar. 29, 2000)
<http://sos.state.nvus/nvelection/1998General >. The Nevada constitution, however,
mandates approval by voters in consecutive elections in order for the amendment to take
effect. See NEV. CONST. Art. 19 § 4. Therefore, Nevada voters will have to vote in favor of
the initiative again in the 2000 election before medical marijuana will he legal tinder state
law. Similarly, although voters in D.C. passed! their initiative, Congress has prevented the
initiative from becoming law. See infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
7° See Proposition 215: California Compassionate Use Act (codified at CAL. HEALTH
AND SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1997)); Proposition 200: Drug Medicalization, Preven-
tion, and Control Act of 1996 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4312.01 (1999)) [herein-
after Prop. 200]. Although Arizona voters approved Prop. 200 in 1996, the Arizona state
legislature subsequently enacted H.B. 2518 and S.B. 1373. These bills lessen the impact of
Prop. 200 by stating that "the act does not become effective unless the United Slates Con-
gress authorizes the medical use of marijuana ... or the DEA reschedules marijuana to a
schedule other than Schedule I." Am. Rxv. STAT. § 13-4312.01. Proposition 300: Refer-
endum on H.B. '1518 and S.B. 1373 was placed on the 1998 ballot to permit the voters to
decide if these bills should become law. A "NO" Vote on Prop. 300 would reject the two
bills in favor of the original version of Prop. 200, whereas a "YES" vole would accept the
legislature's changes. In the 1998 election, Arizona voters passed Prop. 300, thereby ac-
cepting the legislature's decisicuT to make Prop. 200's enactment conditional on federal
medical marijuana policy. See Lauretta Higgins Wolfson, A Quality of Mercy: The Struggle of
the AIDS-Afflicted to Use Marijuana As Medicine, 22 THOMAS JEFFERSON L. Rev. 1, 17-19
(1999).
71 See DRUG POLICY FOUNDATION, MOM note 67, at 6.
72
 Oregon's initiative, for example, provides an affirmative defense to patient's who
have a debilitating medical condition but who have not obtained a registry identification
card. See Measure 67: Oregon Medical Marijuana Act § 6 (codified at OR. Rev. STAT. §
475.345). A patient must also have a physician's recommendation and norbe in possession
of an amount of marijuana greater than that permitted under the Act. See id. The Oregon
initiative is unique, however, because it goes on to state that, notwithstanding the
affirmative defense provided for under the Act, a patient is also entitled to present the
common law "choice of evils" or medical necessity defense. See id. This is the same defense
discussed infra notes 99-155 and accompanying text.
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certain state controlled substances laws if they suffer from a condition
specified in the initiative." All of the initiatives specify which medical
conditions may he treated with marijuana, and also provide for the
addition of other medical conditions as needed. 74 In order to protect
patients from being arrested and to give law enforcement a means of
verifying whether a person is a legitimate medical marijuana patient,
most of the initiatives establish a confidential patient registry and
identification card system." Those initiatives that do not require the
establishment of a patient registry system instead require a doctor's
approval, either written or oral." All of the initiatives also attempt to
proscribe the amount of marijuana that a patient is allowed to pos-
sess. 77 Lastly, with the exception of permitting patients to grow their
own limited supply, most of the initiatives fail to contain provisions
that provide for a supply of medical marijuana."
As noted above, the District of Columbia included a medical
marijuana initiative on its November 1998 ballot." The initiative ex-
empts medical marijuana patients with a doctor's recommendation
73 See id, The 1998 initiatives were entitled Proposition 8: An Act Relating to the Medi-
cal Uses of Marijuana for Persons Suffering from Debilitating Medical Conditions
(Alaska); Initiative 19: The Colorado Medical Marijuana Initiative; Initiative 59: Legaliza-
tion of Marijuana for Medical Treatment Initiative of 1998 (D.C.); Ballot Question 9: A
Constitutional Amendment to Make Medicinal Marijuana Available to the Citizens of Ne-
vada; Measure 67: Oregon Medical Marijuana Act; Initiative 692: Washington State Medical
Use of Marijuana Act. See id. at 11-34.
74 See id. at 8.
75 See id.
76 See id. The Washington state and D.C. initiatives do not require patient registries. In
the absence of patient registries. Washington state requires written approval from a doctor
and, furtherinore, that patients present suck documentation to law enforcentem if re-
quested. A doctor's recommendation is also required in D.C., but it may be written or oral.
See id.
77 See DRuG I'oucv FounmxrroN, supra note 67, at 8. Some states are more specific in
their terms than others. States such as Alaska, Colorado, Nevada and Oregon, which pro-
scribe very specific possession limits, also provide patients with a legal defense in court if
they can prove that the greater amount of marijuana was needed to treat an illness. Wash-
ington state's initiative is more general, allowing patients to possess a "two month supply."
Similarly, patients in D.C. are permitted to posses a "sufficient quantity" to treat an illness.
See id.
78 See id. Only the Nevada and Washington, D.0 initiatives provide for a supply of
medical marijuana. Nevada requires that the legislature authorize appropriate methods for
supply of the plant to patients. See id. The D.C. initiative goes even ['wilier by allowing the
establishment of toll-profit corporations to cultivate and distribute medical marijuana, as
well as requiring the eventual supply of safe and affordable marijuana to patients enrolled
in Medicare or Ryan White CARE Act-finale(' programs. See id.
See. Initiative 59: Legalization of Marijuana for Medical Treatment Initiative of 1998
(visited Mar. 29, 2000) <http://www.actupdc.org/text59pgium >; see also Tiersky, supra
note 16, at 582.
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from being prosecuted under D.C.'s Uniform Controlled Substance
law and also establishes cannabis buying clubs 80 Although the exit
polling data suggested that the initiative passed by a wide margin, the
votes were not immediately counted because of a provision inserted
into the D.C. budget bill by Representative Bob Barr of Georgia thir-
teen days before election day. 81 This provision prohibited the city
from spending any money on the medical marijuana initiative, leaving
no available funds to count the votes. 82 In September of 1999, advo-
cates filed a law suit in federal court seeking the release and imple-
mentation of the vote. 83
 On September 20, 1999, pursuant to an order
from a federal judge in D.C., the results were released and indicated
that the initiative was approved by 69% of the vote. 84 Like all D.C.
laws, however, the initiative needed approval by Congress. 85 Following
the announcement of the votes, Representative Barr attached an
amendment to the fiscal 2000 D.C. appropriations bill, intended to
prevent the enactment of the initiative. 86
 Two versions of the D.C. ap-
propriations bill were vetoed before a third was signed into law by
President Clinton on November 29, 1999. 87
 The passage of this
amendment represents the first time in history that Congress has
overturned a ballot initiative passed by a majority of voters in a legal
election.88
On November 2, 1999, Maine also addressed the issue of medical
marijuana when 61% of voters passed Question 2, a law favorable to
the medical use of marijuana.86
 Under Question 2, patients will not be
prosecuted for the medical use of marijuana so long as they have a
doctor's. written approval to use marijuana. 6° Despite strong opposi-
88 See DRUG Policy. FOUNDATION. supra note 67, at 23-24.
81 See Tiersky, supra note 16, at 582-83.
82 See id.
" See Bill Miller, Marijuana Vole to Be Released: Judge Unlocks D.C. Election Tally, WASH.
POST, Sept. 18, 1999, at B01.
84 See id.
SeeTiersky, supra note 16, at. 582.
Seell.R. 3064, 106th Cong. § 167(b) (1999).
87 Seell.R. 3194, 106th Cong. (enacted by Pub. Law No. 106-113 (1999)). U.R. 3194, a
$385 billion OlilUibus appropriations bill, was a collection of nine separate bills. See id.
• " See Marijuana Policy Project, Patients Protest Congressman Bob Barr's Move to Overturn
D.C. Medical Marijuana Initiative, Press Release, Sept. 20, 1999 (visited Mar. 29, 2000)
<http://wmcmpp.org/nr092099.html >,
" See Maine Medical Marijuana Act of 1998, Initiated Bill No. 2, 1999, Chap, 1
(codified at ME. Rev. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383 (b) (5) (West 1999)). The initiative also
amends Me. Rev. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 5821 (West 1999) and Me. Rev. STAT. ANN. tit. 17—A,






Lion, Maine passed Question 2 by an overwhelthing margin, 91 and be-
came the sixth state since 1996 to enact a law legalizing medical mari-
juana.92 Most recently, the state legislatures in Maryland and Hawaii
have addressed the issue with pro-medical marijuana legislation,"
while the citizens - of Arkansas are advocating for a constitutional
amendment or ballot initiative permitting medical marijuana use by
the seriously ill.94
Although the state actions described above exempt legitimate
medical marijuana users from prosecution under state law, those same
users are nonetheless subject to prosecution under federal law." In-
deed, as the result of Congress' efforts in recent years to expand fed-
eral criminal law jurisdiction to include matters traditionally within
the purview of the states, the federal government enjoys concurrent
jurisdiction with the states in a wide variety of areas. 96 One such area is
91 See Support for Maine's Medical Excuse Marijuana Initiative Stalls, Bus. WIRE 08:23;00,
Nov. 2, 1999; Meredith Goad, Mainers Strongly Support Marijuana for Medical Reasons, PORT-
LAND PRESS HERALD, Nov. 3, 1999, at 1A.
92 Maine joins Alaska, Arizona, Califoritia, Oregon mid Washington state.
' 93 The Maryland General Assembly introduced a bill prohibiting state and local law
enforcement from arresting seriously ill patients if they have doctor's recommendation. See
Marijuana—Exception for Compassionate Use, H.B. 308, 404th Gen. Assent. (Md. 2000);
see also Marijuana Policy Project, Support Maryland Medical Marijuana Bill (visited Mar. 29,
2000) Chttp://www.mpp.org/Maryland/inclex.html >. The Hawaii Senate and I - louse
have both passed bills allowing seriously ill people to possess small amounts of marijuana
for personal use. See "LB. 1157, 20th Leg. (Haw. 2000); S.B. 862, 20th Leg. (Flaw. 2000);
James Sterngold, Hawaii Lawmakers Approve Bill on Medical Use of Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 2000. - Once signed into law by the governor, 14awaii will become the first state to
enact a medical marijtiana law through its legislature. See Hawaii Lawmakers OK Medical
Marijuana. L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2000, at A29.
94 See Mark Minton, Need Exists to Reform 'Pot' Law, Group Says, ARKANSAS DEMOCRATIC-
GAZETTE, Feb. 21, 2000, at BI.
95 See 21 U.S.C. § 841. Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United Slates Constitu-
tion, federal laws enjoy legal superiority over any conflicting state law. See U.S. CoNsT, Art.
VI. ("This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursu-
ance thereof shall be the supreme law of the land ...."). For discussion of the Su-
premacy Clause pertaining to conflicts betWeen state laws or constitutions and federal law,
see ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 143 7-164 (3d, ed. 1999); see also,
JOItN E. NowAR RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-13 (5th ed. 1995).
96 See Greg Hollon, Note, After the Federalism Binge: A Civil Liberties Hangover; 31 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. REV. 449, 449 (1996) (noting that in vastly increasing federal government's ju-
risdiction over activities traditionally considered purely stale matters, Congress has relied
primarily on expansive reading of commerce clause); W. John Moore, The High Price of
Good IntentionS, NAT'L Lj., May 8, 1993, at 1140 (noting more than three-thousand crimi-
nal statutes passed by federal government , prior to 1993). For a more in depth discussion
of the federalization of Criminal laW, see Kathleen f Brinkey, Criminal Mischief The Federali-
zation of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1144-45 (1995); Stephen Chip.
pendale, More Harm than Good: Assessing Federalization of Criminal Law, 79 MINN. L. REV.
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that of drug control and enforcement. 97 Thus, unless medical mari-
juana defendants are entitled to assert a legal defense to prosecution
under federal law, they will continue to be convicted, and the will of
the people in those states legalizing medical marijuana will be frus-
trated. The common law defense of necessity offers hope for such de-
fendants and their supporters in states throughout the country."
III. HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL NECESSITY DEFENSE
The concept of necessity as a defense to prosecution has been
"anciently woven into the fabric of our culture."99 At common law, the
necessity defense was known as the "choice of two evils" defense be-
cause the actor was usually in the position of being imminently
threatened by a dangerous force that only could be overcome by vio-
lating the law. 10° The necessity defense is founded upon the theory
that individuals should not be punished when they are not acting out
of free will," and recognizes that "the law ought to promote the
achievement of higher values at the expense of lesser values, and that
sometimes the greater good for society will be accomplished by violat-
ing the literal language of the criminal law." 142 The necessity defense
thus involves assessing individual conduct and comparing it with
community values to determine personal culpability.i"s
The English courts introduced the concept of necessity as early as
1551. 104
 The necessity defense has since become ingrained in Ameri-
455, 461-65 (1994); Sara Sun Beale, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME AND JUSTICE 775, 775-79 (Sanford H. Radish et al eds., 1983).
97 See, e.g., 21 U.S.0 § 841-44 (2000) (regulating drug transactions, including simple
possession of user amounts of controlled substances).
98 See infra notes 156-261, 297-375 and accompanying text.
99 See Edward B. Arnokls & Norman F. Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law:
The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 289, 291 (1974) (quoting
J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 416 (2d ed. 1960)).
100 SeeTodd H. Whitton, Commonwealth v. Hutchins: A Defendant is Denied the Right to Pres-
ent a Medical Necessity Defense, 27 NEW ENGL. L. REv. 1101, 1101 (1993).
101 See id. (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
28).
102 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 382 (1972).
1 °3 John T. Parry, The Virtue of Necessity: Reshaping Culpability and the Rule of Law, 36
Hous. L. REV. 397, 439 (1999).
104 See P.R. Glazebrook, The Necessity Plea in English Common Law, 30 CAMBRIDGE Li. 87,
93 (1972) (citing Reninger v. Fagossa, [1551] 1 Plowden, 75 Eng. Rep.) The court in
Reninger stated that "A man may break the law, and yet not break the law itself ... where
the words of them are broken to avoid greater inconvenience, or through necessity, or by
compulsion." See id. (emphasis added). In addition to Glazebrook, for a more in-depth
treatment of the necessity defense at English common law, see Benjamin Reeve, Necessity: A
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can jurisprudence, and today over thirty states have codified the de-
fense. 105 Although there is no federal statute codifying the common
law defense of necessity, the Supreme Court of the United States rec-
ognized the applicability of the defense in federal court in 1980, in
United States v. Bailey, 106 and the necessity defense remains a well-
established defense to federal criminal prosecution not involving
homicides. 107 In addition to the English common law notion of neces-
sity, American jurisprudence has developed and extended the role of
necessity in the law. 108 The doctrine of "medical necessity" is one such
example. 102
The first successful articulation of the medical necessity defense
in the history of the common law, and indeed, the first case to extend
the necessity defense to the crimes of possession or cultivation of
marijuana, was United States v. Randall."° In 1976, in Randall, the D.C.
Superior Court accepted the defendant's medical necessity defense
and consequently held that the defendant was "not guilty" of the
crime of possession • of marijuana. 111 The defendant, Robert Randall,
suffered from a severe case of glaucoma, which led to an almost total
loss of vision. 112 Randall began smoking marijuana cigarettes after
conventional drugs proved ineffective in treating his failing eyesight,
and on August 27, 1975, he was arrested and charged with possession
Recognized Defense, 21 Nrw. ENG. L. Rxr. 779, 781 (1985-1986); Celia Wells, Necessity and the
Common Law, 5 Ox•otto J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 72 (1985).
105 Sec Reeve, DIM note 104, at 786 n.42. Most state statutes that have codified a neces-
sity or choke of evils defense follow the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 3.02
(1)(c) (1998).
10° See 444 U.S. 394, 415-16 (1980) (stating that necessity defense exists in prison es-
cape case but defendant failed to establish defense because he failed to show that escape
was only available alternative).
lo See e.g., United Slates v. Newcomb, 6 F.3d 1129, 1134 (6111 Cir. 1993) (holding ne-
cessity defense available to defendant charged with violations of federal firearm possession
statute); see also 'WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. SGOrr, I SLIRSTANTI 'YE CRIMINAL LAW 631-
33 (1986): American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries, § 3.02, cmi.,11.1
(1985).
las See Reeve, supra note 104, at 785.
109 See id, The medical necessity defense has been extended to a number of other con-
texts as well, including abortion, where it would otherwise have been illegal. See id. (citing
Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986); Sinmpoulus v.
Virginia, 462 U.S. 500 (1983)).
110 No. 6592345 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov 24, 197(1), reprinted in 104 DAILY WASH. L. REP.
2249 (1976); GRINSPOON BC BAKALAR, supra note I, at 57; Robin Isenberg, Note, Medical
Necessity as a Defense to Criminal Liability: United States v. Randall, 46 GEO. WASI I. L. REV. 273,
277 (1978).
m See Randall, 104 DAILY WAstt. L. REP. at 2254.
112 See Id. at 2249.
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of marijuana:113 In response to Randall's assertion of the medical ne-
cessity defense, the court set forth the requisite elements of the de-
fense: (1) that the defendant did not intentionally bring about the
circumstances that precipitated the unlawful act; (2) that the defen-
dant could not accomplish the same objective using a less offensive
alternative; and (3) that the evil sought to be avoided was more hei-
nous than the unlawful act perpetrated to avoid it. 114 In applying the
medical necessity defense, the court balanced the defendant's interest
in health against the state's interest in enforcing drug laws that pro-
tect the public. 115 The court concluded that the defendant's right to
preserve his sight outweighed the state's interest in outlawing the
drug. 116 As a result, the court held that the defendant was not guilty of
marijuana possession. 117
In addition to the elements enunciated in Randall, the common
law generally has recognized that the defense of necessity is available
only in situations where the legislature has not precluded the defense
by a clear and deliberate choice regarding the values at issue. 118 In
other words, the defense is available where the legislature has not it-
self, in a criminal statute, balanced the competing harms to the state
and to the individual and made a determination regarding the values
of each." 9 If the legislature has done so, its decision governs.'"
however, the legislature is silent on the matter, the question of the ne-
cessity defense is open and courts can properly weigh the merits of
the competing interests. 12 1
Since Randall, states have varied greatly in their acceptance of a
medical necessity defense in cases involving violations of marijuana
113 See id.
114 See id. at 2252.
113 See id. at 2252-53.
116 See Randall, 104 DAILY WAst r. L. REP. at 2253.
117 See id. at 2254. After being arrested and charged for possession of marijuana, Ran-
dall petitioned the federal government for access to medical marijuana. See GRiNsPoom
BAKALAR, supra note I at 57. The IND Program, discussed supra notes 35-40, was created
in response to Randall's action. See United States v. Burton, 894 F.24 188, 191 (6th Cir.
1990); CRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note I, at 57.
1111 See LAFAVE Scum, supra note 107, at 382. The Model Penal Code, which contains
the language used by most states that have codified the defense, incorporates this idea.
Section 3.02 provides that: "(1) Conduct which the actor believes is necessary to avoid
harm or evil to himself or another is justifiable, provided that (c) a legislative purpose
to exclude the justification does not otherwise plainly appear." MODEL PENAL CODE, § 3.02
(1)(c).
119 See LAFAVE & SCOTI, supra note 107, at 382.
L" See id.
121 See irt.
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law. 122 In 1991, in Jenks v. State, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Florida held that a state statute Classifying marijuana as a Schedule I
substance did not . preclude the use of the medical necessity defense,
and furthermore,. the defendants had established such a de-
fense. 123 The appellant, Kenneth Jenks, a hemophiliac, contracted
AIDS through a blood transfusion and unknowingly passed it on to
his wife Barbara.124 As a result of both the disease and the medication
administered, the Jenks experienced severe nausea and suffered
significant weight loss. 125 The Jenks began using marijuana that they
obtained on their own and found that they were able to retain their
AIDS medication, eat, gain weight and maintain their health. 126 After
being unable to procure a prescription for marijuana, the Jenks de-
cided to grow two marijuana plants of their own. 127 They were subse-
quently arrested for cultivation of marijuana and possession of para-
phernalia. 128 The court denied the State's claim that the Florida
legislature had foreclosed the necessity defense by scheduling mari-
juana as a substance with no valid medical use, and stated that a stat-
ute should not be interpreted as abrogating the comninon law unless it
unequivocally calls for such treatment. 129 Finding that the Jenks met
their burden of proving the elements of a medical necessity defense as
set forth in Randall, the cotirt held that the trial judge erred in reject-
ing the defense and convicting the Jenks as charged."°
Notwithstanding the decisions of state courts in other jurisdic-
tions that are consistent with the holdings in Randall and Jenks, some
state courts have been unwilling to accept the medical necessity de-
fense.131 In 1993, in Commonwealth v. Hutchins, the Massachusetts Su-
122 Compare e.g., Jenks v. State, 582 So.2d 676, 679 (Fla. Dist. Gt. App. 1991) (holding
that medical necessity available as defense to charges of cultivation of marijuana and pos-
session of paraphernalia), with Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 575 N.E.2d 741, 745 (Mass.
1991) (holding that medical necessity not available to defendant charged with cultivation
and possession of marijuana).
123 See 582 So.2d at 679-80.
124 See id. at 677.
125 See id, The conventional medication given to the Jenks to treat the nausea was inef-
fective. See id. Barbara's,weight dropped from 150 to 112 pounds in three weeks. See id,
126 See id.
' 27 See id.
1 Y8 See, Jenks, 582 So.2d at 677.
129 See id. at 679.
I" See id. at 679-80.
131 See, e.g., State v. Hastings, 801 P.2d 563, 564-65 (Idaho 1990) (holding that com-
mon law necessity defense available to defendant claiming she used marijuana to control
pain and muscle spasms associated with rheumatoid arthritis); People v. Trippet, 56 Cal.
App. 4th 1532, 1538-39, review denied, 1997 Cal. LEM 8225 (1997) (stating that medical
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preme Judicial Court rejected the medical necessity defense.'" The
defendant, Joseph Hutchins, was a forty-eight year old Navy veteran
who suffered from scleroderma and Raynaud's phenomenon.'" In
addition to causing other physical ailments, these diseases had an es-
pecially severe effect on Hutchins' gastrointestinal tract. 154 Hutchins
found that smoking marijuana alleviated many of his symptoms in-
cluding: nausea; loss of appetite; difficulty in eating, drinking or swal-
lowing; loss of mobility of the esophagus; spasticity; hypertension; and
anxiety. 135
 Unable to secure a legal supply of marijuana, Hutchins was
eventually arrested for cultivating and possessing two pounds of mari-
juana with the intent to distribute.'" The court determined that a
threshold question in such cases is whether the harm that would have
resulted from compliance with the law significantly outweighs the
harm that reasonably could result from the court's acceptance of ne-
cessity as an excuse. 137 • Only when the circumstances favor excusing
the defendant, will the court then inquire into the elements of the
defense."8
 The court held that the harm to the defendant did not
necessity defense assumed valid); Sowell v. State, 738 So.2d. 333, 334 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App.
1998) (holding that medical necessity defense available in criminal prosecution of seri-
ously ill patient using marijuana to treat glaucoma and combat nausea); State v. Bachman,
595 P.2d 287, 288 (1-law. 1979) (holding that medical necessity defense available as defense
to marijuana charges in proper case); Slate v. Diana, 604 P.2d 1312, 1316-17 (Wash. App..
Ct. 1979) (stating that medical necessity is encompassed in common law defense of neces-
sity and applicable in context of possession of marijuana where defendant used marijuana
to ease symptoms of multiple sclerosis). But see, e.g., Hutchins, 575 N.E.2d at 741 (holding
that medical necessity not available to defendant suffering from sclerodernia as defense to
charges of cultivation and possession of marijuana); State v. Hanson, 468 N.W.2d 77
(Minn. App. 1991) (holding that medical necessity not available to defendant suffering
from epilepsy as defense to charge of manufacturing marijuana); State v. Tate, 505 A.2d
941 (NJ. 1986) (holding that medical necessity not available to defendants suffering from
quadriplegia as defense to charge of possession of marijuana).
132
 See Hutchins, 575 N.E.24 at 745.
133 See Whilton, supra note 100, at 1110.
14 See id. at 1110.
135 See id. at 1111.
136 See id. at 1112.
137 See Hutchins, 575 N.E.2d at 744.
138 See id. In addressing the elements of the necessity defense, the court stated:
We have ruled that the application of the defense is limited to the following
circumstances: (1) the defendant is faced with a clear and imminent danger,
not one which is debatable or speculative; (2) the defendant can reasonably
expect that his [or lied action will be effective as the direct cause of abating
the danger; (3) there is [no] legal alternative which will be effective in abat-
ing the danger; and (4) the Legislature has not acted to preclude the defense
by a clear and deliberate clthice regarding the values at issue.
See hi. (quoting Commonwealth v. Schucliarch, 557 N.E.2d 1380, 1381 (Mass. 1990)).
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outweigh the potential harm to the public as a result of the negative
impact on drug enforcement efforts, and thus, there was no error in
denying the right to present the medical necessity defense." 9
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Liacos concluded that
Hutchins had, in fact, met his burden of production on the defense of
necessity, and thus, the jury should have determined whether his ac-
tions were justified. 14° Essentially arguing against the majority's
threshold question requirement, Chief Justice Liacos accused the ma-
jority of "speculative fact fincling." 141 While recognizing the impor-
tance to the public of enforcing drug laws, Liacos did not believe that
the interest would be harmed significantly by permitting a jury to
consider whether the defendant cultivated and used marijuana in or-
der to alleviate painful symptoms of an illness. 142 Furthermore, Judge
Liacos stated that the majority did not adequately consider the values
supporting the common law defense of necessity; namely, "that under
very limited circumstances, the value protected by the law is, as a mat-
ter of public policy, eclipsed by a superceding value which makes it
inappropriate to apply the usual criminal rule." 143
Like Hutchins, other state courts have rejected the medical neces-
sity defense, often based on the belief that the state legislature had
already spoken on the appropriateness of the defense. 144 State courts
generally have found evidence of such legislative intent not by refer-
ence to state scheduling laws, which are usually analogous to federal
law, but rather by reference to the legislature's explicit exclusion of
the defense in the text of a statute or the legislature's establishment of
a research program providing access to marijuana for certain pa-
tients. 149
149 See Hutchins, 575 N.E.2d at 745.
140 See id. at 745 (Liacos, C.J., dissenting).
141 See id. (Liacos, CJ., dissenting).
142 See Hutchins, 575 N.E.2d at 746 n.1 (Liacos. C.J., dissenting).
143 Id. (Liacos, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d
457, 460 (Mass. App. 0.1982)).
144 See, e.g., Hanson, 468 N.W.2d at 79; Tate, 505 A,2(1 at 945-46.
145 See, e.g., Hanson, 468 N.W.2d at 78 (rejecting defendant's medical necessity defense
where defendant claimed that marijuana was necessary to treat epilepsy symptoms, stating
that by creating medical research program where only cancer patients could receive drug,
legislature had already spoken 0/ ► medical use of marijuana); Tale, 505 A.2d at 944-45
(holding that legislature had foreclosed medical necessity defense by establishing Danger-
ous Substance Therapeutic Research Act and allowing for exception in drug offense stat-
ute for substances received pursuant to valid prescription); see also Suzanne D. McGuire,
Medical Marijuana: State Law Undermines Federal Marijuana Policy—Is the Establishment Going
to Pot?, 7 SAN JOAQUIN AcRtc. L. REV. 73, 81-91 (1999). For an in depth discussion of state
therapeutic research programs, see Dogwill, supra note 58, at 255-67.
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Contrary to state courts' wide-ranging treatment of the medical
necessity defense in connection with the use of marijuana, federal
courts' consideration of the defense in the marijuana context was,
until recently, limited to a single case. 148 In 1990, in United States v.
Burton, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rec-
ognized the medical necessity defense as being applicable in the con-
text of a federal prosecution for the manufacturing and use of mari-
juana, but held that the defendant failed to establish one element of
the defense."7
 Defendant, James Burton, suffered from glaucoma and
claimed that he grew and used marijuana to relieve the symptoms
from his illness."8 He was charged with three counts of unlawfully
manufacturing and possessing marijuana and one lesser charge of
simple possession."9 The trial court permitted Burton to present a
medical necessity defense and the jury found him not guilty on all but
the charge of simple possession. 259 Burton appealed the jury's verdict,
claiming that it was inconsistent with the evidence, and thus, unrea-
sonable. 151 The court, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Bai-
ley, acknowledged that the medical necessity defense was available in
cases involving the medical use of marijuana by seriously ill individu-
als. 152 Like some of its state court counterparts, however, the Sixth
Circuit opined that the IND Program recently established by the fed-
eral government mitigated against a finding that Burton had no rea-
sonable, legal alternative to the illegal manufacturing and use of mari-
juana. 158 Thus, in holding that the jury's verdict was not unrea-
sonable, the court stated that the medical necessity defense was avail-
able under federal law but was not established by the defendant in
this particular case. 15't Eight years passed before a federal appeals
court, this time in California, once again had the opportunity to
wrangle with the question of whether the medical necessity defense
was valid under federal law. 188
' 46 See894 F.2d 188, 191 (6th Cir. 1990)
145 See id.
149 See id. at 190.
149 See id. at 189.
150 See id. at 190.
' 51 See Burton, 894 F.2(1 at 190.
152 See id. at 191.
155 See id.	 •
134 See id.
199 See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3(1 1109, 1111  (9th Cir.
1999).
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RECENT MEDICAL NECESSITY CASES IN CALIFORNIA
In 1996, the people of California approved Proposition 215, also
known as the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, which was one of the
first state initiatives of its kind. 156 Under the law, patients or their pri-
mary caregivers who possess or cultivate marijuana for medical treat-
ment recommended by a physician are exempted from criminal
prosecution under state law. 157 Since the passage of Proposition 215,
the U.S. Justice Department has repeatedly stated that marijuana re-
mains banned under federal law, with no medical exemption. 158 Thus,
pursuant to federal law, the Department has threatened to act against
LW Proposition 215 reads as follows:
113.112.5. (a) This section shall be known and may be cited as the Compas-
sionate Use Act of 1996. (b) (I) The people of the State of California hereby
find and declare that the purposes of the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 are
as follows: (A) To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to ob-
tain and use marijuana for medical purposes where the medical use is
deemed appropriate and it has been recommended by a physician who has
determined that the person's health would benefit from the use of marijuana
ill the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma.
arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which marijuana provides relief.
(B) To ensure that patients and their primary caregivers who obtain and use
marijuana for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a physician are
not subject to CrililiDai prosecution or sanction. (C) To encourage federal
and state governments to implement a plan to provide for the safe and af-
fordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of mari-
juana. (2) Nothing in this act shall be construed to supercede legislation pro-
hibiting persons from engaging in conduct that endangers others, nor to
condone the distribution or marijuana for nonmedical purposes. (c) Notwith-
standing any other provision of law, no physician in this state shall be pun-
ished, or denied any right or privilege for having recommended marijuana to
a patient for medical purposes. (d) Section 11357, relating to the possession
of marijuana, and Section 11358, relating to the cultivation of marijuana,
shall not apply to a patient or any patient's primary caregiver, who possesses
Or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon
the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician. (c) For the
purposes of this section, "primary caregiver" means the individual designated
by the person exempted under this act who has consistently assumed the re-
sponsibility for the housing, health, or safety of that person.
Proposition 215: California Compassionate Use Act (codified at CAL. HP:At:rim & SAFETY
CODE § 11362.5 (West 1997)).
157 See id.
158 See, rg.. J. Wells Dixon, Note, Cannon! n Alceaffily: Physicians, Marijuana, and the
First Amendment, U. Cow. L. Rm.. 975, 979 (1999); Wolfson, supra note 70, at 22; Bob
Egelko, Lorkyer Backs "Necessity" Defense, Asks Feds to Drop Opposition, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct.
14, 1999, at 1.
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doctors who prescribe the drug and has sued to shut down six North-
ern California clubs that distribute marijuana to patients. 159
In 1998, in United States v. Cannabis Cultivator's Club, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California held, inter
alia, that medical necessity was not a defense to injunctive relief. 1613
Following the passage of Proposition 215, the United States filed six
separate lawsuits against six independent marijuana clubs and indi-
viduals associated with the management of the dispensaries, seeking
to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the defendants' conduct. 161
The central issue was whether the defendants' admitted distribution
of marijuana for use by seriously ill individuals under a physician's
recommendation violates federal law, and if so, whether the conduct
should be enjoined pursuant to the injunctive relief provision of the
federal Controlled Substances Act ("the Act"). 162
 After laying out the
preliminary injunction standard , 165 the court considered and subse-
quently rejected the defendants' arguments that the Act did not apply
to their case.'" The court then considered the affirmative defense
159 See Dixon, supra note 158, at 979. California has experimented extensively with
cannabis clubs since the passage of their medical marijuana initiative, Proposition 215.
This experimentation has resulted in two distinct distribution models. One model is based
on a conventional, pharmacy-like delivery system: A patient visits a buyers' club where he
or she presents a note from a physician..The proprietor of the club fills the prescription
and the patient leaves to use the medicine, presumably at home. Oakland Cannabis Buy-
ers' Club is one of a number of clubs that follow this model. The second model resembles
a social club more than a pharmacy. The club has a menu offering various tyres and
grades of marijuana. Similar to an Antsterdam-style coffee house, most people stay after
they obtain their marijuana to smoke and talk. See Grinspoon, Time of Prohibition, supra
note 21, at 479.
16° See 5 F. Sum). 2d 1086,1102 (N.D. Cal. 1098).
161 See id, at 1092.
162 See id. at 1091.
163 See id. at 1098-09. When deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the
court stated that it considers: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the possibility
of irreparable harm to the moving party if the injunction is not granted; (3) the balance of
hardships; and (4) in certain cases, whether the public interest will be advanced by grant-
ing preliminary relief. The court went on to state that itt cases where the federal govern-
ment seeks to enforce a statute, once the government has met the "possibility of success
prong" of the test, the court will presume that the government has met the "possibility of
irreparable injury" prong because the passage of the statute itself implies a finding by
Congress that a violation will cause a harm to the public. See id. at 1099.
164 See id. at 1090-1100. Among the arginnents submitted by the defendants in support
of their contention that federal law was inapplicable, the defendants reasoned that federal
law applies only to illicit or illegal distribution of marijuana, not medical marijuana, which
is legal titular state law. See id. In dismissing the defendants' argument, the court stated
that although Proposition 215 does not directly conflict with federal law because it allows
persons who obtain and use marijuana for medical pin -poses to be exempt from state drug
laws, and because it does not legalize the distribution of marijuana, such distribution is pro-
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submitted by the defendants that, even if the law applied to their case,
the common law necessity defense justified their conduct. 165 Reiterat-
ing the standard set forth by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Agui-
lar; the court stated that in order to assert the necessity defense, de-
fendants must prove that: (1) they were faced with a choice of evils
and chose the lesser evil; (2) they acted to prevent imminent harm;
(3) they reasonably anticipated a direct causal relationship between
their conduct and the harm to be averted; and (4) there were no legal
alternatives. 166 The defendants asserted that they met each of the req-
uisite elentents. 167 In response to the defendants' claim that they sa-
tisfied the fourth element because their members had no reasonable
alternative, the government argued that the defendants did have an
alternative—they could petition to have marijuana rescheduled from
a Schedule I substance to a Schedule II substance. 168 The court
agreed with the defendants' contention that rescheduling was not a
reasonable alternative because of the delay and bureaucratic burden
it imposed on patients. 169 Nonetheless, the court denied the necessity
defense because the defendants did not offer proof that the defense
would apply to every patient to whom the defendants provided mari-
juana.'" The court went on to caution that it was not ruling that the
necessity defense was wholly inapplicable to injunction actions, but
rather that sufficient facts were not present for the court to determine
whether such a defense was available in this case. 171 Therefore, the
hibited by federal law, and thus, the relevant federal law applies to the defendants. See id. at
1009-103.
165 See Cannabis Cultivatoa' Club, 5 F. Stipp. 2d at 1101-02.
IG5 See id. al 1101 (quoting United Slates v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662,693 (0th Cir. 1989)).
167 See id. at 1101. First, the defendants claimed that they were laced with two evils—let-
ting their members die, go blind or suffer severe pain, or risking violation of federal law—
and they chose the lesser evil. Defendants claimed that they could Hied the second and
third requireinents because the harm to be averted was imminent and supplying mari-
juana to their members was necessary to prevent that harm. Lastly, they claimed that they
had no legal alternative: legal drugs were not effective in treating iiie syrnptunis of many of
their members and thus, they had no legal or safe alternative. See id.
168 See id. at 1102.
169 See
170 See. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Stipp. 2d at 1102. According to the court's hold•
ing, in order for the defense lo be available, defendants would have had to have proven
that each and every patient to whom it provided cannabis was in danger of imminent
harm; that the cannabis would alleviate the harm for that particular patient; and that the
patient had no other alternatives. See id.
171 See id. Judge Breyer stated: "If a preliminary or permanent injunction is granted,
and the federal government alleges that defendants have violated the injiniCiion, there will
be specific facts and circumstances before the Court to determine if the jury should be
given a necessity instruction as a defense ... ." See id.
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court held that, given the lack of supporting facts, medical necessity
was not an appropriate defense to the issuance of an injunction. 172
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative ("OCBC"), one of the
defendants in Cannabis Cultivators Club, chose not to appeal the dis-
trict court's ruling on the medical necessity defense but instead filed
two new motions."3
 The district court denied both motions, and
OCBC appealed the denial of these motions as well as a subsequent
order by the district court finding the defendants in contempt of the
preliminary injunction. 174
 The first motion OCBC filed was a motion
to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on grounds that an Oakland City
ordinance made OCBC immune from liability under federal law. 175
The second was a motion to modify the court's injunction to permit
the distribution of marijuana to patients having a doctor's certificate
stating that marijuana is a medical necessity.I 76
In 1999, in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative
("Buyers' Cooperative"), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit stated that it did not have jurisdiction to hear either the
appeal of the denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss or the dis-
trict court's contempt order, but could consider the order denying
the defendant's motion for modification.'" On this issue, the court
held that the district court erred in accepting the government's ar-
gument that it lacked the discretion to grant OCBC's request for a
modification that would exempt from the injunction distribution to
172 See id, The Court also addressed the defendants' third and final argument that the
injunction should be denied because it would infringe upon the fundamental right to be
free from unnecessary pain and to receive palliative treatment for a painful medical condi-
tion, to care for oneself anti to preserve one's own life. The court denied defendants'
claim holding that the government was likely to prevail at trial on the issue of whether
defenclants have a constitutional right to medical marijuana. Again, the roilyt noted that it
was not denying that such a right may exist as a matter of law, but only that the defense is
inapplicable to the injunction action. See id.
173 See Buyers' coop., 190 F.3d at 111 l.
174 See id. at 111i.
171 See id.
176 See id. °CRC. asked the district court to modify the injunction to allow cannabis to
continue to be distributed to patients whose physicians certify that: (1) the patient suffers
from a serious medical disorder; (2) the patient will stiffer imminent harm if the patient
does not have access to marijuana; {3) marijuana is necessary for the treatment of the
patient's medical condition, or marijuana will alleviate the medical conditions or symp-
toms associated with it; and (4) there is no legal alternative to marijuana for the effective
treatment of the patient's medical condition because the patient has tried other medical
alternatives to marijuana and has found them ineffective in treating his or her condition,
or has found that such alternatives result in intolerable side-effects. See id.
177
 See id. at 1111-12.
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seriously ill individuals for whom marijuana was a medical necessity. 178
The court stated that it was within the district court's equitable juris-
diction to allow the modification,"9 especially in light of the many
declarations submitted by OCBC of seriously ill patients and their
doctors,. attesting to the patients' medical need for marijuana. 180
Moreover, the court stated that there was no evidence in this case that
Congress had intended to divest the court of its broad equitable dis-
cretion. 181 Additionally, the court noted that because the government
decided to enforce the federal marijuana laws by seeking an injunc-
tion—as opposed to the usual Process of arresting and prosecuting
those that it believed had committed a crime—the court was required
to deal with any violations on an anticipatory basis. 182 The court rea-
soned, therefore, that it should consider any available defenses on an
anticipatory basis as well. 183 Implicit in the court's statement is the fact
that because the defense of medical necessity is available at trial to a
patient or cannabis club accused of violating federal marijuana law, it
thus should be made available in an action for injunctive relief. 184
Lastly, the court concluded that the district court further erred by fail-
ing to expressly consider the public interest in denying the injunction
on the record. 185
According to the court, while OCBC identified a strong public
interest in the availability of a doctor-prescribed treatment to help
suffering patients, the government identified no interest in blocking
distribution, aside from its general interest in enforcing the statute. 188
This failure to weigh or consider the public interest, the court stated,
was an abuse of the district court's discretion. 187 Finding that the dis-
trict court erred in refusing to consider OCBC's motion for mod-
178 See Buyers' Coop., 190 F. id at 1115.
179 See id. at 1114. The Ninth Circuit noted that by stating that "its equitable powers do
not permit it to ignore federal law ... the district court misapprehended the issue. The
court was not being asked to ignore the law. It was being asked to take into account a legally




181 See id. (citing Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hotel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1156 (9111 Cir.
1988) (holding that courts retain broad equitable discretion when it collies to injunction
against violations of federal statutes sinless Congress has clearly and explicitly demon-
strated that it has balanced equities and mandated injtinction)).
182 See id. at 1114.
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ification based on a lack of authority, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
order denying the motion and remanded the case for reconsideration
of OCBC's motioti. 1"
Despite the urgings of California's Attorney General to the con-
trary, 189
 the Department of Justice requested that the Ninth Circuit
reconsider its ruling, maintaining that the medical necessity defense
is invalid because of Congress's declaration that marijuana has no
medical benefit. 19° On March 2, 2000, however, the Ninth Circuit de-
cided to deny the government's petition for a rehearing en banc. 191
Therefore, assuming the Clinton Administration wishes the Depart-
ment of Justice to continue its challenge of the propriety of the Ninth
Circuit's decision, the only remaining option is an appeal to the
United States Supreme Court.
The Ninth Circuit's ruling is especially significant in light of two
other cases currently pending in federal court in California. 192 The
first case, United States v. Smith, represents the first federal criminal
prosecution of a medical marijuana patient and caregiver 193 since the
passage of Proposition 215 in 1996. 194 On May 21, 1999, B.E. Smith
was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of California of the manufacturing and possession of marijuana
in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. 195 On August 6, 1999,
Smith was sentenced to twenty-seven months in prison—the maxi-
mum sentence authorized by law and a term seventeen months longer
188
 See Burs' Coop., 190 F.3d al 1114.
159 See Bob Egelko, supra note 158. In an attempt to get the Clinton Administration to
drop its opposition to medical marijuana, Attorney General Bill Lockyer wrote a leiter to
United States Attorney Janet Reno urging the government not to appeal the Ninth.Cir-
cuit's ruling. See id.
190
 See Justice Department Asks for Rehearing of Medical Marijuana Ruling, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Oct. 27, 1999.
t91 See Buyers Coop., 190 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-16950); see also Robert Raids
(counsel to OCBC), Major Victory for Medical Marijuana in California: 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals Denies Clinton Administration's Petition of for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, MARI-
JUANA NEWS (visited Mar. 29, 2000) <http://216.9.192.67/news.php3?sid=133 >.
192 See United States v. Smith, (E.D. Cal. 2000) (No. CR S-97-558 GEB); United States
v. McWilliams, (C.D. Cal. 1999) (No. CR-97-997 (A-GHK)).
193
 Under Proposition 215, caregivers are those persons who cultivate medical mari-
juana for distribution to specific patients.
194 See Rachael Swain, B.E. Smith: Compassionate Caregiver or Common Criminal?, MARI-




 See Defendant's Memorandum Re Bail Pending Appeal and Remanded issue of
Medical Necessity Defense; Request for Hearing at 1, United States v. Smith, (E.D. Cal.
2000) (No. CR S-97-558 GEB) thereinafter Defendant's Memorandum Re Bail.'.
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than that which was recommended by the federal Probation Depart-
ment in its pre-sentence investigation report. 196
Smith, a decorated Vietnam veteran, began suffering from Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD") shortly after his return from the
wan 197 Following the passage of Proposition 215, Smith's doctor rec-
ommended marijuana in order to treat the pain and other symptoms
associated with his condition. 198 Shortly thereafter, Smith established
himself as a "caregiver" pursuant to Proposition 215 so that he could
grow marijuana for his personal medical use. 199 Smith eventually be-
came the caregiver for nine other seriously ill patients suffering from
various illnesses including cancer, sickle cell anemia, AIDS and
chronic pain due to a severed limb. 2" From the time he began grow-
ing marijuana plants, Smith meticulously documented his activities
and informed local law enforcement officials, such as the sheriff and
district attorney, of his intentions. 201 None of the law enforcement
officials with whom Smith spoke discouraged him from growing ► ari-
juana or counseled him on the illegality of such action under federal
law. 202 In addition, Smith had posted a sign in his front yard reading
"Medical Marijuana Garden," and had attached to it all of the relevant
doctor recommendations. 203 Nevertheless, on September 24, 1997,
federal officers seized upon Smith's home, searched his property and
destroyed his marijuana plants.204 At that time, Smith was growing
eighty-seven plants—just enough, he claimed, to accommodate him-
1• See id. at 2.
1" See Defendant's Declaration of Counsel in Support of Memorandum Re Bail Pend-
ing Appeal and Remanded Issue of Medical Necessity Defense at 2, United States v. Smith,
(E.D. Cal. 2000) (No. CRS-07-558 GEB) [hereinafter Defendant's Declaration of Coun-
sel]. Although Smith was not formally diagnosed with 1"I'SD until after his conviction, his
family and close friends have been aware of his condition since his return front Vietnam.
See id.
125 See Defendant's Memorandum Re Bail, supra note 195, at Exhibit B (Correspon-
dence from Dr. Jeri Rose, June 6, 1997).
1" See id. at Exhibit C (caregiver designation). Under Proposition 215, patients can
also serve as caregivers. See Cm.. 14Enurn & SAFF;Tv Con; § 11362.5 (C) (2) (c) (West 2000).
200 See Defendant's Declaration of Conine!, .supra note 197, at 3.
201 See Defendant's Memorandum Re Bail, supra note 195, at 9-10; Swain, supra note
194, at 4.
202 See Defendant's Memorandum Re Bail, supra note 195, at 10; Swain, sepia note 194,
at 4.
2" See Defendant's Memorandum Re Bail, supra note 195, at 9-10; Swain, supra note
194, at 4.
2°1 See Swain, supra note 194, at 5.
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self and the others for whom he was a caregiver. 205
 Significantly,
Smith's case represented the first time in Northern California that a
person was prosecuted under federal law for the possession of less
than one hundred marijuana plants. 206
At trial, Smith was prohibited from making any mention of his
medical condition or the reason that he was growing marijuana. 207
This was the result of a decision by the district court to grant the gov-
ernment's pre-trial motion to exclude any defenses relating to Propo-
sition 215 or the medical use of marijuana, including medical neces-
sity. 208
 The government reasoned that because federal law fails to
recognize that marijuana has any medical value, as evidenced by its
scheduling of marijuana as Schedule I, any defenses related to such a
claim are barred in a federal case.2®
On September 13, 1999, following Smith's conviction for manu-
facturing and possession of marijuana, the district court filed an order
denying the defense's request for release on bail pending appeal and
remanded Smith into custody until his sentencing on August 6,
2000. 210
 In denying the request, the district court set forth the stan-
dard under federal law for determining whether to grant bail pending
appea1. 211
 Pursuant to that standard, a convicted defendant shall be
detained pending appeal unless the judicial officer finds:
205 See Denny Walsh, Actor Harrelson, Judge Clash in Pot Trial, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 21,
1999, at 2.
2°6 See Swain, supra note 194, at 5.
2° 7 See Defendant's Memorandum Re Bail, supra note 195, at 1.
2°5 See id. Smith's lzmyeis had sought to introduce four separate defenses to the
charges of manufacturing and possession in addition to medical necessity: (1) substantive
due process; (2) Section 884(a) "valid prescription" defense; (3) entrapment by estoppel;
and (4) reliance on the advice of counsel. See Order at 6-10, United States s Smith, (E.D.
Cal. 1999) (No. CR S-97-558 GEB) [hereinafter District Court's Order'.
In addition to granting the government's pre-trial motion, Judge Burrell also
overturned a discovery motion that had been granted by a U.S. Magistrate regarding
Smith's claim of selective prosecution. See id. The Magistrate had granted a request by the
defense to compel the federal government to disclose documentation relating to the deci-
sion to prosecute Smith. See id. The government appealed the Magistrate's decision and
judge Burrell reversed. See id. at 5.
20° See Government's Opposition to Smith's Motion for Bail Pending Appeal Following
Remand at 4 n.1, United States v. Smith (F.D. Cal. 2000) (No. CR S-97-558 GEB) [herein-
after Gov't Oppositionl.
2111 See District Court's Order, supra note 208, at 2.
211 See id. at 1. The court stated that the decision of whether to grant bail pending ap-
peal is governed by the provisions of the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) (2000). See
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(A) by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not
likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the
community if released . . . ; and (B) that the appeal is not for
the purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of law or
fact112 likely to result in (1) reversal, (2) an order for a new
trial, (3) a sentence that does not include a term of impris-
onment, or (4) a reduced sentence to a term of imprison-
ment less than the total of the time already served plus the
expected duration of the appeal process. 2"
According to the court, the defense . failed to show by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence that Smith would not pose a "danger to the safety of
the community" if released. 214 Specifically, the district court found
that there was a high likelihood that Smith would continue to traffic
marijuana if released. 2 " The district court's determination that Smith
was a potential danger to the community was sufficient to disqualify
him for release pending appea1. 2" Nonetheless, the court went on to
state that its denial of Smith's previously asserted defenses relating to
Proposition 215 or the medical use of marijuana does not raise "sub-
stantial questions of law or fact" likely to result in reversal, a new trial
or a greatly reduced sentence. 2 " Specifically, with respect to the
medical necessity defense, the district court ruled that Smith could
not utilize the defense—either at trial or in his motion for release
pending appeal—because he had not first pursued the rescheduling
of marijuana, and therefore, had "bypassed the available administra-
tive procedures established by Congress to effect a change in how
marijuana is classified under federal law."218
The district court's decision to deny release on bail pending ap-
peal was rather unusual given the magnitude of the charges and the
fact that Smith had no prior convictions. 20 Furthermore, the decision
highlighted the tension that existed between the district court judge,
212 See id. at 1-2. A substantial question of law or fact has been interpreted by the Ninth
Circuit and other federal circuit courts of appeals to mean "one that is 'fairly debatable' or
`fairly doubtful.' Iu shoo, a 'substantial question' is one of more substance than would be
necessary to a finding that it was not frivolous." United States v. Handy, 761 F.3d 1279.
1280 (Oilt Cir. 1985).
213 18 U.S.C. S 3143(b) (1) (A), (II) (2000) (emphasis added).
214 See District Court's Order, SUpra note 208, at 3-4.
215 See id. at 4.
216 Ser id. at 5-10.
217 So, id.
218 See id. at 6.
212 See Swain, supra Role 194, at 3.
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Judge Burrell, and the defense, and served to illuminate some of the
Judge's own views on marijuana.22° Indeed, after denying bail, Judge
Burrell stated that marijuana is a gateway to "violence, gangs and the
destruction of families and communities. "221
On September 27, 1999, Smith appealed the district court's deci-
sion by motion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.222
 It is noteworthy that Smith's appeal came fourteen days af-
ter the Ninth Circuit had issued its opinion in Buyers' Coop., holding
that it was within the district court's discretion to permit the distribu-
tion of marijuana to seriously ill individuals who could satisfy the ele-
ments of the medical necessity defense. 223 Notwithstanding the court's
earlier decision in Buyers' Cooperative, however, on October 13, 1999, a
Ninth Circuit Panel denied Smith's motion for bail pending appeal,
stating that "appellant has not shown that the appeal raises a 'substan-
tial question' of law or fact that is likely to result in reversal, [or] an
order for a new trial . . "224
 The Panel did not go on to determine
whether Smith was likely to flee or posed a danger to the community
if released.225
Maintaining that the Panel erred in failing to recognize the de-
nial of the medical necessity defense as an issue raising a "substantial
question" of law that is likely to result in reversal or a new tria1, 226
Smith filed a motion with the Ninth Circuit on October 29, 1999,
seeking reconsideration of the Panel's Order. 227
 In support of his mo-




 SeeAppellant's Motion for Reconsideration of Application of B.E. Smith for Release
Pending Appeal at 3, United States v. Smith (9111 Cir. 1999) (No. 99-10477) [hereinafter
Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration].
223 See BllyerS Coop., 190 F.3t1 at 1114 (decided Sept. 13, 1999); Appellant's Motion for
Reconsideration, supra note 222, at 3.
221
 Order at 1, United States v. Smith (9th Cir. Oct. 13, 1999) (No. 99-10447).
225 See id.
225
 See Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 222, at 2. Smith's attorneys'
believed that the Panel erred thither by refusing to find a "substantial question" likely to
result in a reversal or new trial with regards to other decisions by the district court as well.
See id. at 2 u.l. Specifically, the defense maintained that the district court wrongfully over-
turned the U.S. magistrate's decision regarding selective prosecution and ,improperly ex-
cluded evidence regarding the entrapment by estoppel and advice of counsel defenses. See
id. In recognition of the limited circumstances for a motion for reconsideration, however,
the defense limited its petition to the district court's denial of the medical necessity de-
fense. See id.
227 See id. at 1. Ninth Circuit Rule 27-10 authorizes a petitioner to seek clarification,
reconsideration or rehearing of an order. Rule 27-10 states:
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don for reconsideration, Smith argued that the Panel overlooked or
misunderstood Ninth Circuit precedent and directly contradicted the
court's decision in Buyers' Cooperative. 228 According to Smith, the court
in Buyers' Cooperative not only reaffirmed its earlier decision in Aguliar,
which recognized the necessity defense generally, but also expressly
applied the medical necessity defense to those citizens using medical
marijuana. 229 Furthermore, Smith maintained that although Buyers'
Cooperative involved the government's seeking civil injunctive relief to
close the OCBC, that case is not distinguishable from his own case
because the court in Buyers' Cooperative specifically addressed the ap-
plicability of the medical necessity defense to criminal defendants when
it stated that "[h]ad the government proceeded in the usual way, by
arresting those it believed had committed a crime ... the defendants
would have been able to litigate their necessity defense under Aguilar in due
course."230 Consistent with the court's decision, therefore, Smith
urged that he was in exactly the same position as those individuals
identified in Buyers' Cooperative, and thus should have been allowed to
litigate his necessity defense at trial. 231
Additionally, Smith argued that the Panel erred in refusing to
reverse the district court's conclusion that Smith's medical necessity
defense was properly denied—both at trial and on his motion for re-
lease pending bail—because he had not exhausted his legal alterna-
tives by seeking the rescheduling of marijuana with the federal gov-
ernment. 232 Smith maintained that the court in Buyers' Cooperative
made clear that this "administrative alternative" was irrelevant to the
medical necessity inquiry. 233 Thus, in light of the court's decision in
Buyers' Cooperative, Smith argued that the denial of his medical neces-
A party	 shall state with particularity the points of law or fact which, in the
opinion of the movalu, the court has overlooked or misunderstood. Changes
in legal or factual circumstances which may entitle the movam to relief also
shall be stated with particularity.
See id. (stating Ninth Circuit Rule 27-10).
228 See Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, SIIPM note 222, at 2-7.
229 See id. at 5 (woofing tlrc req u irements set forth by court in Buyers' Cooperative, as well
as its recognition that medical marijuana was "legally cognizable defense").
239 See id. (quoting Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d at 1115).
231 See id, at
292 See Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 222, at (-7.
2" See id, :Al 7.
732	 Boston College Law Review
	
[Vol. 41:699
sity defense raised a "substantial question" of law that is likely to result
in reversal or a new trial, thus entitling him to bail pending appea1. 234
On February 3, 2000, the Ninth Circuit issued an Order granting
Smith's motion for reconsideration of the court's October 13, 1999
order denying bail and remanded to the district court the issue of
whether Smith is entitled to bail pending appeal. Reaffirming its deci-
sion in Buyers' Cooperative, the Ninth Circuit stated:
In light of this court's decision in United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, . . . Smith is entitled to bail
pending appeal if he can demonstrate: 1) a likelihood that
he was entitled to present a medical necessity defense at
trial; and 2) his release does not pose a danger that he will
distribute marijuana to people not falling within the class of
individuals described in OCBC ... Accordingly, we remand
for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to con-
duct this inquiry in the first instance. 235
Thus, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the medical necessity defense
is available as a matter of law to criminal defendants who can offer
sufficient facts to establish a likelihood that they will be able to satisfy
the requisite elements of the defense at trial.236 Pursuant to the
court's order, therefore, the district court must consider the facts in
the record and determine whether there is a likelihood that Smith
will be able to satisfy the elements of the medical necessity defense—
as set forth Buyers' Cooperative and reaffirmed by the Order—at tria1. 237
If the district court finds the existence of such facts, Smith is entitled
to bail pending his appeal. 238
On remand, therefore, the parties are limited to arguing, on the
facts of the case, (1) whether Smith and the patients for whom he
provided marijuana satisfy the requirements for the medical necessity
234 See Order at 1-2, United States v. Smith (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2000) (No. 09-10447)
[hereinafter Ninth Circuit Order]: Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, supra note
222, at 2-7. Smith also addressed the district court's ruling that he is a flight risk or a dan-
ger to the safety of the community. See Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, supra note
222, at 7. Although the Ninth Circuit remanded this issue to the district court, Smith ar-
gued that the district court's conchosion was 'inseparably enmeshed with that court's un-
supported and inaccurate belief that lie was an unjustified and flagrant violator of federal
law who had no right to assert a medical necessity defense." See id. at 8.
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defense set forth in Buyers' Coope ► ative,239 and (2) whether Smith poses
a danger that he will distribute marijuana to people not falling within
the class of individuals described in Buyers' Cooperative, 24° Further-
more, as the result of the court's reaffirmation of Buyers' Cooperative,
the government has been forced to abandon its earlier contention
that because marijuana is a Schedule I substance, a medical necessity
defense is never available in a marijuana case. 241 Nonetheless, the
government maintains that the defense should not apply to Smith in
this case. 242
The Ninth Circuit's Order in Smith is a historic decision insofar as
it represents the first time that a circuit court recognized the applica-
bility of the medical necessity defense for medical marijuana in a fed-
eral criminal prosecution. 243 Furthermore, the court's Order seems to
imply that a criminal defendant, while on bail pending appeal, may
lawfully distribute medical marijuana to those people suffering from
2" See id. Smith argues that he and the people to whom he distributed marijuana are
in the same position as those described in Buyers' Club, and tints, he meets the minimum
threshold showing that he had a right to present his medical necessity defense at trial. See
Defendant's Memorandum Re Bail, supra note 195, at 11-14. The government argues that
Smith cannot avail himself of the defense because he fails to satisfy the requirement of
"necessity," which the government suggests requires a showing of an "emergency" or "abso-
lute and uncontrollable necessity." See Gov't Opposition, supra note 209, at 2-7 (citing
United States v. Durrell, 758 F.2(1427,431). Indeed, the government states that Smith does
not allege that he was faced with imminent danger of dying or permanent disability. See id.
at 0. Smith argues. in turn, that the government's definition of the necessity requirement
is not supported by case law and contradicts both Aguilar- and Buyers' Club. See Defendant's
Reply Memorandum Re Bail Pending Appeal and Remanded Issue of Medical Necessity
Defense at 2-3, United States v. Smith (E.D. Cal. 2000) (No. CR S-97-558 GEB) (arguing
that government's interpretation of United Stales v. Darrell is incorrect, but regardless. the
case is irrelevant. because it preceded Aguilar and Buyers' Club) [hereinafter Defendant's
Reply Memorandum]. The government also maintains that Smith had other legal alterna-
tives including the use of other drugs, such as \ Tallinn, and the pursuit. of rescheduling by
the federal government. See Gov't Opposition, supra note 209, at 0-7, Smith urges that.
both of the government's arguments concerning legal alternatives arc in contradiction of
Buyers' Club and the Ninth Circuit's directives in his case. See Defendant's Reply Memoran-
dum, seem, at 4-5 (stating that even assuming some degree of merit in government's ar-
gument concerning medical alternatives, such a question is for jury).
210 See Defendant's MCMOrall(111111 Re Bail, septa note 195, at 14-15; Gov't Opposition,
septa note 209, at 7-10.
NI See Gov't Opposition. supra note 209, at 4. The government stated that it disagreed
with the cour't's analysis in Buyers' Club that there was no evidence of Congress's intention
to divest district court's of their broad equitable discretion. See id. The government main-
tains that Congress has divested the courts of such discretion by choosing to classify mari-
juana as Schedule I. See id. at 11.1.
'242 see id,
213 See Letter from David M. Michael, attorney for B.E. Smith, Feb. 24, 2000 (on file
with author).
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serious medical conditions for which marijuana provides necessary
relief. 244
 In addition, it is important to note two key differences be-
tween the Ninth Circuit's decisions in Smith and in Buyers' Coop. First,
the federal government's action in Smith involved the criminal prose-
cution of an individual, whereas the government's action against the
cannabis clubs in Cannabis Cultivators Club consisted of injunctions,
which are a civil remedy. 245
 Second, the use and cultivation of mari-
juana by an individual patient or primary caregiver, unlike the distri-
bution of marijuana through cannabis clubs, is explicitly recognized
by California's Proposition 215. 246 Therefore, although the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in Buyers' Cooperative was crucial insofar as it recognized
the appropriateneSs of the medical necessity defense in federal court
and laid the foundation for the court's decision in Smith, it is the lat-
ter decision that will likely have the greatest impact on subsequent
cases involving the criminal prosecution of patients attempting to use
and cultivate marijuana for medical purposes. 247
One case that will be affected by the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Smith is United States v. McWilliams.248
 On November 5, 1999, Judge
George H. King of the United States District Court for the Central
District of California granted the government's pre-trial motion pro-
hibiting the defendants from making any reference to the medical
benefits of marijuana at tria1. 249 Specifically, the defendants were
barred from referring to California Proposition 215, the federal gov-
ernment's own experimental medical marijuana programs or any
claim that marijuana use is a medical necessity. 250
 In July 1998, defen-
dants Peter McWilliams and Todd McCormick were arrested following
a police raid hi Los Angeles that turned up more than four thousand
214 See id. 13y relying on Buyers' Cooperative, which held that cannabis clubs such as
OCI3C may be entitled to continue distributing marijuana to those seriously ill patients
that satisfy the elements of the medical necessity defense, the court's Order in Smith can
reasonably be interpreted as extending the Buyers' Cooperative holding to include someone
acting as a patient's primary caregiver. See Ninth Circuit Order, sepia note 234, at 1-2.
246 Compare District Court's Order, supra note 208, at 1, with Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5
F. Stipp. 2d at 1101.
246
 Although the cannabis clubs urge that they qt taffy as caregivers within the meaning
of Proposition 215, their case is not as clear as Smith, where the individual patient or care-
giver possesses or cultivates medical marijuana.  See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying
text.
247 See Ninth Circuit Order, supra note 234, at 1.
24° See (C.D. Cal. 1999) (No. CR-97-997 (A-61-11()).
245 See David Rosenzweig, Activists Plead Guilty to Drug Charges, L.A. 'rims, Nov. 20,
1999, at 131.
250 See id.
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marijuana plants, and were charged with manufacturing and conspir-
ing to grow and sell marijuana in violation of federal law. 251 The
charges carry with them a minimum sentence of ten years and a
maximum sentence of life in prison.252
The government has sought to characterize McWilliams and
McCormick as commercial dealers, alleging that they were growing
marijuana to sell to marijuana clubs. 253 McCormick maintains that lie
smokes marijuana to treat pain from cancer treatments. 254 He also
claims that he was growing an abundance of plants to determine
which strains work best for which types of illnesses. McWilliams claims
that he uses Marijuana to treat nausea resulting from drugs lie uses to
treat AIDS.255 McWilliams further asserts that he tried other tradi-
tional medication to treat his nausea, including Marinol—a legal drug
in pill form containing THC, the active ingredient in marijuana—but
only marijuana allowed him to keep his anti-AIDS drugs down.256
Since McWilliams' access to marijuana was blocked, he has been un-
able to keep clown his pills and his viral load 257 has risen to 250,000, a
level that greatly reduces the effectiveness of the immune system. 258
Despite pleas by McWilliams' attorney to alter the bail conditions so
that McWilliams can continue to smoke marijuana, Judge King has
said that "he cannot authorize someone to break the law." 259 In ad-
dressing the medical necessity defense, Judge King stated that such a
defense is inappropriate because it contradicts an explicit determina-
tion by Congress to classify marijuana as a Schedule I drug, a sub-
stance with no legitimate medical use. 28°
On November 19, 1999, following Judge King's ruling, McCor-




254 See Rosenzweig, supra note 249, at RI.
255 See id.
2541
	 Lynda Gorov, US Prosecutes Cancer Patient Over Marijuana, Bos'roN GLOBE, Oct.
23, 1999, at Al. For a discussion of the Schedule fI drug, Marino], and why it is not always
as effective as the smoked form of marijuana, see Tiersky, supra note, 16, at 567-68. For
example, the recent. IOM report concluded that "Marinol's oral route of administration
hampers its effectiveness because of slow absorption ." See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCI-
ENCES INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 53, at 205-06.
257 The viral load is the measure of active AIDS virus in the body.
2544 See Mary Curtius, AIDS Patient Pins Hopes on Pot Ruling, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1999, at
A3.
250 See id.
26° See Rosenzweig, supra note 249, at RI.
261 See id.
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government agreed to drop the marijuana manufacturing charges,
which carry a ten-year minimum sentence, and allowed defendants to
plead guilty to the charges of conspiracy to grow and distribute, which
are punishable by a maximum sentence of five years. 262 The guilty
plea allows the lawyers for McCormick and McWilliams to appeal the
district court's medical necessity ruling following the sentencing hear-
ing that occurred on February 28, 2000. 263 In addition to the medical
necessity defense, which the Ninth Circuit has held applicable in
medical marijuana cases, there exists yet another option for avoiding
the conflict between federal and state law; namely, the appropriate
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
V. ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Despite its long standing position in the common law, the case
law dealing with the necessity defense is relatively underdeveloped. 264
This can be explained, in large part, by the fact that many of the cases
in which a necessity defense would be appropriately asserted are sim-
ply not prosecuted.265 The notion that the prosecuting attorney, is
vested with a broad range of discretion in deciding whether to prose-
cute is firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence.266 When exer-
cised properly, this discretion can assure that justice will prevail over
law. 267





 See Arnolds & Garland, supra note 99, at 291.
265
 See id.
266 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JERALD II. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2(a), at 561
(1985); TilEODORE W. HOUSEL & GUY 0. WALSER, DEFENDING AND PROSECUTING FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES 47 (1946). Because of legislative "OVercriminalization" and limitations on
enforcement resources, no prosecutors are able to prosecute all of the offenses that come
to their attention. See LAFAvE & ISRAEL, at 562. One scholar has noted, to deny the exercise
of discretion under these circumstances is like directing a general to attack the enemy on
all fronts at once." See id. (quoting T. ARNOLD, THE SytilisoLs OF GOVERNMENT 163 (1935)).
For a more in-depth treatment of prosecutorial discretion and the role that it should play
in the criminal justice system, see, for example, Gerald E. Lynch, On, Administrative System
of Criminal justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2117, 2127 (1998) (describing policy goals that
guide prosecutorial discretion); Charles W. Thomas & W. Anthony Fitch, Prosecutorial Deci-
sion Making, 13 Am. CRIM. L. ',ZEN'. 506 (1976) (discussing prosecutor's role in charging
decisions).
267 See Amolds & Garland, supra note 99, at 298 (quoting generally F. MILLER, PROSECU-
TION (American Bar Foundation, 1969)). The Supreme Court has stated:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as




"The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation
than any other person in America."268 The role of prosecutorial dis-
cretion in the federal sphere has received increased discussion and
debate in recent years as Congress sought to "federalize" crimes that
are traditionally left exclusively to state contro1. 269 Such concurrent
jurisdiction can result in problems when the values of a state, as evi-
denced by its legislative and constitutional decisions concerning
criminal law or procedure, differ from that of the federal govern-
ment, 270 Federal prosecutorial discretion is thus especially relevant in
states like California that have passed medical marijuana laws, because
it has the potential to correct the imperfection of the federal law's
reflection of state and community values. 271
The Department of Justice ("DOD instructs federal prosecutors
to commence with prosecution when a federal offense is violated and
there is evidence to convict, unless no "Substantial federal interest" is
served by the prosecution. 272 In determining whether to exercise their
prosecutorial discretion to decline prosecution in a particular case,
therefore, prosecutors must first conclude that declining prosecution
would not sacrifice a substantial federal interest. 278 A subchapter of
the DOJ's United States Attorney Manual ("the Manual"), entitled
"Initiating or Declining Charges—Substantial Federal Interest," sets
forth the considerations that a prosecutor should weigh in determin-
ing whether a substantial federal interest is at stake. 274 The Manual
states that:
a criminal prosecution is not just that it shall win a case, but that justice is
done.
Berger v. United Slates, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935),
268 Robert 1 - I. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor; 31 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & Pot.. Sc,.
3,4 (1940).
269 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
278 See Hollon, supra note 96, at 501, 520-213 (arguing for expansive application of se-
lective prosecution doctrine because of perverse incentive given to federal prosecutors in
areas of concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute solely where state constitutional or proce-
dural protections would be advantageous to defendant in state court).
271 see id.
272 UNITED STATIts ATTORNEY MANUAL, Gr011 nth for Commencing or Declining Prosecution,
Tit. 9, Chap. 9-27.220(A) (1997). Two further justifications for declining to prosecute arc
that the person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction, or that there
exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution. See id.
273
 See id.
274 See UNITED &rims ATTORNEY MANUAL, Initiating and Declining Charges—Substantial
Federal Interest, Tit. 9, Chap. 9-27.230 (1997) [hereinafter USAM 9-27.234
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Mu determining whether prosecution should be declined
because no substantial Federal interest would be served by
prosecution i the attorney for the government should weigh
all relevant considerations, including: (1) federal law en-
forcement priorities; (2) the nature and seriousness of the
offense; (3) the deterrent effect of prosecution; (4) the per-
son's culpability in connection with the offense; (5) the per-
son's history with respect to criminal activity; (6) the per-
son's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or
prosecution of others; and (7) the probable sentence if con-
victed or other consequences if the person is convicted. 275
Addressing the first factor, "federal law enforcement priorities,"
the DOJ acknowledges that it must be mindful of the limited en-
forcement resources available. 276 In establishing national prosecuto-
rial priorities, therefore, the DOJ states that it should focus on those
matters that are most deserving of federal attention and that are most
likely to be handled effectively at the federal leve1, 277
 The DOJ also
acknowledges, however, that individual United States Attorney offices
must be free to establish their own prosecutorial priorities within the
national priorities in order to focus most effectively on matters of lo-
cal concern. 278
In referring to its second listed factor, "nature and seriousness of
the crime," the Manual asserts that "of primary importance is the ac-
tual or potential impact of the offense on the community and on the
victim."" Moreover, the Manual states that in assessing the impact of
the offense on the community, a prosecutor properly may take into
account the gravity of the offense and the community's attitude to-
wards prosecution under the circumstances of the case. 280 The impor-
tance of considering the community's views as a factor in deciding
whether to prosecute is emphasized also by scholars who suggest that
prosecutors often decline prosecution based on their expectation
that, given the community's attitude towards a particular offense, a
judge or jury will choose to acquit, notwithstanding proof of guilt be-
275 See id. Although the Manual lists only seven factors, the Comment section of USAM





279 See USAM 9-27.230, supra note 274, § (B) (2).
289 See irl.
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yoncl a reasonable doubt. 281 Thus, the inability of a prosecutor to ob-
tain a conviction for certain offenses, scholars argue, should influence
the decision of whether to prosecute future offenses. 282
The Manual also states that federal prosecutors should take cog-
nizance of a "person's personal circumstances."288 In so doing, the
Manual maintains that: "[s] ome circumstances peculiar to the ac-
cused, such as mental or physical hnpairment, may suggest that
prosecution is not the most appropriate response to his/her of-
fense."284 This factor is thus representative of the DOJ's recognition
that, in the name of justice, prosecutors must tailor their decision of
whether to prosecute, not only to the particular type of offense, but to
the circumstances surrounding the particular person as wel1, 285 Ac-
cording to the DOJ, then, a federal prosecutor should weigh the po-
tential defendant's personal circumstances with the other seven con-
siderations listed in the Manual in deciding whether a substantial
federal interest exists so as to justify prosecution. 286
At least one state's DOJ office decided to endorse prosecutorial
discretion in medical marijuana cases, declining to criminally prose-
"I See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 266, at 564 (discussing discretion of judge and jury
as influence on prosecutor's decision to prosecute); Aaron 'I'. Oliver, NIUte, Jury
Nullification: Should Our TIN of Case Matter?, 6 KAN.J,L. & Puts. 1)01:y 99, 60-62 (1997) (dis-
cussing jury's willingness to nullif law when comn lllll ity views harin restating from crime
to he de minimus or law to be inappropriate restriction on victimless activity); Harvey
Uhlenhopp, The Criminal Trial: Observations from the Bench (speech presented to National
District Attorneys Association / Iowa County Attorneys Seminar), in PRACTICING LAW IN-
STITUTE, THE PROSECUTOR'S SOURCEBOOK 24-5 (B. James George, Jr. ed. 1969). A jury
may exercise its discretion to acquit the guilty for a variety of reasons, including; (I) sym-
pathy with the defendant; (2) belief that the offense is de minimum; or (3) the fact that the
statute violated is an unpopular law. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 266, at 564.
282 See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 266, at 564; Oliver, supra note 28L at 60-62. For
example, a prosecutor in a county where jurors simply will not convict in driving-while-
intoxicated cases absent aggravating circumstances must consider whether it is wise to
continue prosecuting similar cases, See Ulllenhopp, supra note 281, al 24-25.
285 See USAM 9-27.230, SU pro note 274, § (B) (7).
284 See id.
285 see id,
2511 See id, §§ (A) & (B). At least one commentator, however, has suggested that it is na-
ive to believe that a prosecutor's decisions concerning whether to prosecute are controlled
by any rules or guidelines, such as those set forth in the DOD's Manual. See Laurie L.
Levenson, Wodang Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26
FoRDHANt thus. LJ. 553, 558-60 (1999). Rather, Levenson argues that charging decisions
take place within "a gap in the rules—a gap intentionally left so that prosecutors can tailor
justice," Id. at 558. According to Levenson, prosecutors must seek to fill the gap through a
practical sense of what is right and wrong and a moral standard. See id.; see also generally.
Bennet L. GersInnan, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutors Exercise of the Charging Decision, 20
FORDIIAM URn. L.J. 513 . (1993).
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cute medical marijuana patients possessing a sixty-day supply or less of
marijuana. 287
 On December 1, 1999, in a letter that seems consistent
with the DOJ's desire to give individual offices flexibility in defining
their priorities, Western Washington's top federal prosecutor, United
States Attorney Kate Plaumer, stated, "[Oven our limited funding
and overwhelming responsibilities to enforce an ever larger number
of federal offenses, we simply cannot afford to devote prosecutive re-
sources to cases of this magnitude."288 Washington is one of five states
that permits the possession and use of medical marijuana under state
law. 289
 Plaumer stated that she sent the letter to the Seattle police in
order to address the fact that the conflict between state and federal
law puts the police in a difficult position as to which law to enforce. 29°
Plaumer stated that there are policies already in place that preclude
her office from charging qualified medical marijuana patients under
federal law, and thus, police should not enforce federal drug law
against those patients legitimately possessing and using medical mari-
juana under state law. 2491 In response to a question of how much mari-
juana was permitted, Plaumer suggested that an amount fewer than
250 plants would constitute an authorized "sixty-day supply"'of mari-
juana under Washington law. 292
Although prosecutorial discretion potentially can bring the law
into conformity with the values of the community, like all types of dis-
cretion, it has a high potential for abuse. 295 Indeed, Justice Jackson, in
his earlier quoted statement, went on to say that: "While the prosecu-
tor at his best is one of the most beneficent forces in our society, when
he acts from malice or other base motives, he is one of the worst. "294
This abuse is most glaring where the government prosecutes a defen-
dant for political—as opposed to purely legal—reasons.295 In such
cases, contrary to the ideal application of a prosecutor's discretion,
287 Carl M. Ostrom, 1,'eds Clanfy Medical-Marijuana Guidelines; Thjeet Busting Patients, SE-
ATTLE 'rums, Dec. 2, 1999, at III.
288 Sor id.; see also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, Supra note 266. at 565 (stating that established
standards are necessary for each prosecutor's office to guide exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion, particularizing such standards as circumstances that properly can be considered
mitigating or aggravating, or kinds of offenses that should he most vigorously prosecuted
in view of needs).
289 See WASH, REV. CODE ANN. g 69.51A (West 2000).




293 See Arnolds & Garland, supra note 99, at 298.
2" Jackson, supra note 267, at 3.
295 SeeArnolds & Garland, supra note 09, at 298.
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the prosecutor uses the technicalities of the law to harass a person for
conduct that the community might not find criminaL296 Scholars sug-
gest several indicia for when the government is prosecuting "political
defendants": (1) where the defendants are "political persons" dissent-
ing from the conventional wisdom; (2) where the defendants are be-
ing prosecuted in part for what they say or think; (3) where there is
selective prosecution297; and (4) where the trial is not a model of
evenhandedness and judicial restrain t. 298
VI. PLEA FOR COMPASSION
The use of prosecutorial discretion as described above, the medi-
cal necessity defense and the rescheduling of marijuana as a Schedule
II substance, are three routes that the federal government could
choose to implement a compassionate policy regarding medical mari-
juana. Although passage of the congressional legislation supported by
Representative Frank299 and/or the rescheduling of marijuana as a
Schedule H drug by the DEA would constitute the most resounding
support for permitting the use of medical marijuana, they are the
least likely to occur in the near future. Conversely, as public opinion
continues to support medical marijuana, it is likely that more states
will pass initiatives resembling that recently passed in Maine, which
exempts patients with a doctor's recommendation from state criminal
prosecution. 50° The tension between states and the federal govern-
299 See id.
297 A defendant can challenge the use of prosecutorial discretion under claims of se-
lective prosecution as a violation of equal protection, see generally United States v. Arm-
strong. 514 U.S. 546 (1996), or prosecutorial vindictiveness as a violation of due process,
see generally United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979). Doe to the heavy burdens
placed on the defendants, however, both claims are extremely difficult to make out suc-
cessfully. For an exhaustive treatment of the subject, see Josam F. LAWLESS, JR., PROSECU.,
'comm. MISCONDUCT ch.3 (1985 & Stipp. 1990).
298 See Arnolds & Garland, supra note 99 at 298 0.111 ((poling Waltz, Tensions Between
Political Defendants and the Courts, Oct. 15, 1971 (unpublished lecture, u tl College
Speakers Program)). Professor Waltz also included in his list of indicia: (5) where the stat-
ute that is the source of the charges was enacted for the purpose of combating persons like
the defendants who oppose particular administration policies; and (6) where it is neces-
sary to rely tin undercover agents and provocateurs. See id.
299 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (discussing MR. 912).
399 See Maine Medical Marijuana Act of 1098, Initiated Bill No. 2, 1909, Chap. 1
(codified at ME. Ray. STAT. ANN. fit. 22 § 2383 (b) (5) (West 1999)). Several states will con-
sider medical marijuana ballot initiatives in 2000, including Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio
and Florida. SeeTiersky, supra note 16, at 584 (citing Trends & Timelines, Medical Marijuana:
More Ballot Measures to COM AM. POLL NE:mutat, Dec. 11, 1908). Additionally, Colorado
and Nevada will vote again in 2000 to complete their initiative process. See id.
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anent will continue to increase, therefore, if the federal government
refuses to alter its policy regarding marijuana and the states simulta-
neously continue experimenting with new legislative schemes relating
to medical marijuana.
The cases in California, moreover, highlight another growing
conflict—this one involving a dispute over federal law between the
executive and judiciary branches .m The DOJ insists that marijuana
has no legitimate medical use—as evidenced by Congress's classifying
marijuana as a Schedule I drug—and that federal drug law therefore
applies absolutely with no medical necessity exception." The Ninth
Circuit, on the other hand, with its holdings in Buyers' Coop. and Smith,
stated that a medical necessity defense is appropriate in certain cases
where patients are criminally prosecuted under federal law, despite
Congressional scheduling." This question of the appropriateness of
the medical necessity defense in medical marijuana cases is likely to
increase in importance as the medical benefits of marijuana become
more well documented as a result of increased numbers of persons
using marijuana for medical purposes under state law and govern-
ment sponsored studies pertaining to medical marijuana. 3" Addition-
ally, the medical necessity defense likely will continue to represent the
only available option for those patients hoping to escape federal
prosecution, save Congressional legislation or rescheduling. Ulti-
mately, this issue only can be resolved by a decision from the United
States Supreme Court. An antecedent question to that of the appro-
priateness of the medical necessity defense, moreover, is what role, if
any, prosecutorial discretion should play as a means of respecting the
values of those states that support the medical use of marijuana.
A. Rescheduling Marijuana as a Schedule II Substance
As noted above, the most effective and efficient means for seriously ill
patients to legally obtain marijuana is to reschedule marijuana as a
Schedule II substance, thereby allowing doctors to prescribe it to their
patients." Twelve years ago, the DEA's Administrative Law Judge,
Judge Young, held that it would be "arbitrary and capricious" for the
5° 1 See supra notes 156-261 and accompanying text.
3°2 See Gov't Opposition, supra note 209, at 4.
3°3 See Ninth Circuit Order, supra note 234, at 1; Buyers' coop., 190 F.3d at 1115.
5°4 See supra notes 48-65 and accompanying text (discussing government reseai-cat); su-
pra notes 66-98 and accompanying text (discussing state laws permitting use of medical
marijuana).
305 See supra notes 45-65 and accompanying text.
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DEA to refuse to transfer marijuana to Schedule Il."6 Since that time,
the federal government has ignored the pleas of patients, doctors and
medical organizations to make marijuana available for those in seri-
ous need. The people of this country clearly favor a more compas-
sionate policy from the federal government regarding medical mari-
juana. 307 Indeed, citizens in states throughout the country have
spoken on the issue through the initiative process, and public opinion
polls show similar support for medical marijuana in other states as
wel1. 3°8 Just this year, the IOM's report, which was commissioned by
the federal government, documented marijuana's therapeutic poten-
tial and urged the federal government to implement some policy
whereby patients in serious need can receive marijuana initnedi-
ately."
Given the overwhelming support for medical marijuana in the
United States, it is time that Congress and the DEA respect the will of
the people and reschedule marijuana as Schedule II substance.n° It is
the contention of this Note, moreover, that if the government insists
on conducting further studies, they at least should follow the recom-
mendation of the IOM and reopen, or create something comparable
to, the Compassionate Use IND program, which was suspended in
1992. 3"
B. Federal Prosecutorial Discretion as a Solution to Federal-State Conflict
Although the ultimate goal for medical marijuana advocates should
be rescheduling, the immediate objective ought to be preventing
those suffering from serious illnesses from being criminally prose-
cuted under federal law. In those states that have passed medical mari-
juana initiatives, federal prosecutors should avoid the conflict be-
"6 See In Re Manjttana Rescheduling Petition, Docket 86-22, Opinion, Recommended
Ruling, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision of Administrative Law Judge,
Washington, DC: Drug Enforcement Administration (1988).
307 See supra notes 65-98 and accompanying text.
"8 See	 In a development that may foreshadow a more reasonable federal policy in
the future, both presidential candidates—Vice President Al Gore and Governor George W.
Bush—have indicated that they support medical marijuana, framing the issue as one im-
plicating either patients' or states' rights. See Dana Hill, Gore Baths Medical Marijuana,
ABCNEWS.com , Dec. IS, 1999 (visited Mar. '29, 2000) <http://ahcnews.go.com/ sec-
tions/politics/DailyNews/gore991215.1itml>: Susan Feeney, Bush Baths States' Rights on
Marijuana, DALLAS MoRN[NC, NEWS, Oct. 20, 1999, at 6A.
" See NATIONAL ACADEMY or SCIENCES INsTrr tun OF MEDICINE, SUpla note 53, at 1.
31° S'eeTiersky, supra note 16, at 595; McGuire, supra note 145, at 96.
311 See NATIONAL. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 53, at 126.
744	 Boston College. Law Review	 !Vol. 41:699
tween federal and state law by declining to prosecute and thus re-
specting the values of the citizens vis-a-vis medical marijuana.512 In-
deed, when exercised appropriately, prosecutorial discretion serves to
make the law consistent with the values and notions of justice held by
a particular community. 313 Given the apparent willingness of the peo-
ple in some states to tolerate a violation of federal marijuana law
when there is a serious medical need, it seems clear under the DOJ's
prosecution guidelines that a local federal prosecutor is justified in
declining to prosecute such violations. 5"
In the first place, as the letter sent from Washington's U.S. Attor-
neys office to the Seattle police made explicit, the criminal prosecu-
tion of those legitimately possessing or using medical marijuana un-
der state law should not and must not be a top priority of federal
prosecutors.315
 Those states that have passed laws like California's
Proposition 215 authorizing the use of medical marijuana have spo-
ken on what they see as the proper priorities for law enforcement. 3 t6
That is, implicit in the passage of such laws is the statement that pre-
cious law enforcement resources should be used to' prevent violent
crimes that endanger the safety of its citizens, not to pursue seriously
ill individuals using marijuana for medical purposes. 317 Therefore,
consistent with the flexibility granted to individual U.S. Attorneys
offices in the Manual, offices in every state with laws permitting medi-
cal marijuana should make formal announcements similar to that
made in Washington, declining to _prosecute legitimate medical mari-
juana patients. 318
312
 See supra notes 66-08 and accompanying text, discussing state initiatives; Dixon, su-
pra note 158, at 1017.
313
 See Arnokls &Cadmic!, supra note 99, at 298.
314 See UNITED STATEs ATTORNEY MANUAL, Croundi for Commencing or Declining Prosecu-
tion, Tit. 9, Chap. 9-27.000 (1997).
315 See Ostrom, supra note 287, at 131.
315 Remarks, Panel Discussion: The Prosecutor's - Role in Light of Expanding Federal Criminal
Jurisdiction, 26 FORM LAM URB. L.J. 657, 664 (1999) (discussing medical marijuana contro-
versy in California as example of inconsistency between federal and state law enfbrcement
priorities) [hereinafter Panel Discussion].
3" Sre id.
918 See supra notes 286-91 and accompanying text; see also generally Steven I). aymen,
Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643 (1997) (stressing
need for local priorities). This decision would also show sensitivity towards important is-
sues of federalism generally. See Panel Discussion, supra note 316, at 665-68. As Congress
continues to expand the federal government's criminal law jurisdiction, a conscious deci-
sion must be made by prosecutors in each case over whether it is wise to override decisions
that are made by the states. See id.
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Other DOS factors point towards declining to prosecute as wel1. 30
When considering the "nature and seriousness" of a seriously ill per-
son violating federal marijuana law, prosecutors must consider the
fact that the violation does not have a significantly negative impact on
the community. 32° In passing laws that permit medical marijuana, citi-
zens codified their values with respect to the seriously ill and medical
marijuana. 321 In exempting medical marijuana patients from criminal
prosecution under state law, the citizens of these states engaged in
their own balancing test and concluded that any impact that the viola-
tion of state law may have oti the community is minimal when com-
pared with the potential harm to seriously ill people who are denied
effective medicine. Unfortunately, due to federal constitutional con-
straints, the citizens of the individual states cannot exempt medical
marijuana patients from prosecution under federal law. 322 It must be
the case, however, that were such restraints not applicable, the views
of these same citizens towards a violation of federal marijuana law un-
der the same circumstances, would be identical.
Furthermore, in many of the cases involving medical marijuana,
the defendants are facing criminal charges for the first time in their
lives. As the DOJ's Manual points out, the absence of any prior crimi-
nal activity should weigh against prosecution. 323 Similarly, prosecutors
lutist be aware of the fact that criminally prosecuting seriously ill peo-
ple under federal marijuana laws, especially those with no prior
criminal history, will fail to achieve one of the primary goals of crimi-
nal law—the deterrence of criminal activity. 324 Indeed, implicit in
cases involving a "choice of evils" or necessity is the fact that a far
greater harm will come to the person who chooses to obey a particu-
lar law.325 So long as those seriously ill patients for whom marijuana is
their only hope of relief conclude that violating federal law is a lesser
evil than enduring the pain and suffering associated with being un-
able to receive the necessary treatment, the mere threat of prosecu-
tion is unlikely to serve as much of a deterrent.
319 See supra notes 275-86 and accompanying text.
no See supra notes 279-82 and accompanying text.
921 See Arnolds & Garland„mpra note 99, at 298.
322 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
423 See USAM 9-27.230, supra note 274. § (8) (5).
324 See id. (listing deterrent effect of prosecution as factor in determining whether to
prosecute).
325 See Reeve, supra note 104, at 785-87.
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Lastly, prosecutors must consider the personal circumstances of
the potential defendant in each case 526 To criminally prosecute and
incarcerate seriously ill individuals, including those who are suffering
tragically from conditions such as cancer or AIDS, is contrary to our
notions of justice and common decency as well as the great spirit of
human compassion that, itself, defines our laws.3 27 Indeed, these un-
fortunate individuals should be spending their most difficult and
painful days with loved ones, not left to deteriorate in a federal court-
room or an overcrowded prison where they are treated like criminals.
It is quite likely, moreover, that the DOJ was focusing on precisely
such seriously ill individuals when drafting its guidelines specifically to
include a place for the consideration of a potential defendant's "per-
sonal circumstances."328
Despite the many sound reasons reflected in the DOJ's Manual
for declining to federally prosecute seriously ill people who legiti-
mately cultivate or possess marijuana under state law, it is unlikely,
due to political pressures, that many states will follow Washington's
lead.329
 Indeed, the federal government's unwillingness to forgo
prosecution of those violating federal drug laws, even the seriously ill,
is the result of the fact that many medical marijuana defendants are
charged for "political" reasons. 330 Such political trials commonly in-
volve an abuse of prosecutorial discretion."' Medical marijuana cases
are no exception.
As discussed above, there are several indicators of when the gov-
ernment is prosecuting a defendant for political reasons. 332 One such
indicator is that the defendant is dissenting from the conventional
wisdoms" Those that represent views contrary to the current dogma
are seen as a threat and, as such, are prosecuted vigorously regardless
of any other extenuating circumstances. 334
 In the context of medical
3" See USAM 9-27.230, supra note 274, § (B) ( 7).
327 See Defendant's Memorandum Re Bail, supra note 195, at 3.
328 See USAM 9-27.230, supra note 274, § (B) (7).
329 See Elizabeth T. Lear, Criminal Law: Contemplating the Successive Prosecution Phenome-
non in the Federal System, 85 J. Cium. & CRIMINOLOGY 625, 634-35 (noting political motiva-
tions of U.S. Attorneys in desiring to appear tough on crime as influential in decision to
prosecute).
33o
	 Lear, 5Upro note 329, at 634-35; Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalism of the
Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 566
(1992).
331 See Arnolds & Garland, supra note 99, at 298.
332 See supra notes 297-98 :nut accompanying text. .
233
 See id.
334 SeeArnolds & Garland, supra note 99, at 298 n.1 1 I ).
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marijuana, the "war on drugs" represents the current dogma or con-
ventional wisdom, at least among politicians and law enforcement
officials."6 The war on drugs, which was declared in the 1960s and
reinvigorated in the 1980s, is motivated by the government's percep-
tion that the public desires a zero-tolerance, "tough on crime" ap-
proach to drugs. 896 This approach has had disastrous effects on health
and health care throughout the United States."? Indeed, the federal
government's vigorous prosecution of the seriously ill reflects the
government's perception that anything less signifies an unacceptable
retreat in the war on drugs."8 Unfortunately for those ill serious
medical need, moreover, many incorrectly believe that medical mari-
juana advocates are simply using the medical context as a hook for
larger-scale legalization. 889 Those suffering from cancer, AIDS and
335 For a more in-depth treatment of the motivations and history behind the war on
drugs, see, for example, Paul Finkehnait, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the
War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389 (1993), and Lisa NI, Biaoculli, Note, 1bir on Drugs:
Fact, Fiction, and Controversy, 21 SE TON HALL LEGIS. J. 169.
339 See DOUGLAS N. linsAK, DRuGs AND RIGHTS 9 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1992)
Berger, supra note 330, at 566; Finkelman, supra note 335, at 1392, 1396. This perception
was evidenced, for example, in 1988 during George Bush's acceptance speech: "Zero tol-
erance isn't a policy, iis [sic) an attitude ... My administration will be telling the dealers:
Whatever we have to do, we'll do it, but your day is over." 1988 Republican Nation Convention
Rush Text, Stakes are High—Choice is Crucial, L.A. 'rums, Aug. 19, 1988 (emphasis added).
Even if government's perception were in fact accurate with respect to drugs generally, it is
clearly erroneous in the context of medical marijuana, which receives overwhelming pub-
lic support.
337 See Lester Grinspoon, The War on Drugs—A Peace Proposal, 330 N. ENG. J. MED. 357,
358 (1994) (stating thou federal law enfOrcement policies have strangled medical potential
of marijuana) [hereinafter GrinspoOn, The War on Drugs].
33° See Dogwill, cu/na note 58, at 286-87 (stating that war against drugs will be seen by
many as futile if marijuana is allowed to be smoked as medicine); see also Finkelman, supra
note 335, at 1397; Dixon, supra note 158, at 980. This perception is fueled largely by the
government's belief' that marijuana is in "gateway drug" and that legalization of marijuana
for medical purposes will send the wrong message to children about drug use in general.
See. Dogwill, supra note 58, at 287. As discussed above, however, the recent TOM report
specifically rejected both of these claims. See supra liDICS 58-59 and accompanying text.
339 See Raymond J. Walsh, Jr., Note, Populations at Rislr for Criminal Liability Under Com-
passionate Use Acts, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON GRIM. & CIV. CONVINEMENT 275, 283 (1099): see also
Dixon, supra note 158, at 980; Dogwill, supra note 58, at 287. For example, in response to
protests by medical marijuana supporters, Representative Barr of Georgia said, 1111 is
truly sad to see marijuana legalization activists using seriously ill patients as props in their
campaigns to make dangerous, mind altering drugs legally available." David Pace, Medical
Marijuana Use Advocates Stage Protest at Barr's House Office, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 21, 1999.
Query, however, why those who supported'the decision to classify cocaine, methadcine and
other highly addictive drugs as Schedule 11 were not similarly seen as advocates for legali-
zation. See Finkelman, supra note 335, at 1397. Clearly, cocaine and methadone are more
addictive and hartithil than marijuana. Could it he the rather narrow yet enduring view
that "marijuana supporters." medical or otherwise, are associated with the "subversives" or
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other horrific diseases or conditions thus have become the innocent
casualties of the war on drugs. 34°
Furthermore, as asserted by the lawyers of B.E. Smith, Todd
McCormick and Peter McWilliams, medical marijuana defendants are
often selectively prosecuted, largely because of their outspoken views
in support of medical marguana. 341 All three of the above-named de-
fendants were ardent and vocal supporters of Proposition 215 and
medical marijuana.342
 Smith, for example, is well-known for his writ-
ings on constitutional rights and individual liberties.m The federal
government's decision to prosecute in the case of Smith is even more
suspect due to the fact that he was charged with cultivating and pos-
sessing only eighty-seven. plants—an amount well below the 250
maximum that the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washing-
ton state has suggested. 344 Also, as noted above, Smith's case was the
first federal case in Northern California where an individual was
prosecuted for cultivating or possessing under 100 plants. 345
 The
McWilliams case contains several disturbing oddities as well, regarding
the issue of why they, and not other offenders, were selected for
prosecution. The key witnesses in the government's case were large-
scale buyers, sellers and growers of medical marijuana, many of whom
were worse offenders than the defendants. 346 Moreover, the govern-
ment does not allege any sales by the defendants, only that they "in-
tended" to sell to the government's witnesses, who, in the meantime,
are still on the street buying, selling and growing marijuana.'? Surely,
"hippies" that were so despised by the Establishment throughout the 60s? See BONNIE &
WHITBREAD II, supra note 25, at 262-63 (discussing perception of marijuana users as sick,
emotionally maladjusted persons).
340 See Finkel Mall, supra note 335, at 1397.
" See Richard Cowan, Was the Decision to Prosecute B.E. Smith Made at the Mite House?
The Key Question About the Selective Prosecution of Medical ∎Ilariptana Activists, MARIJUANA
NEWS, (visited Mar. 29, 2000) <littp://www.markjuananews.com/was_thr_decision_
to_prosecutelattn>. The federal government has also sought to silence voices in the
press that have spoken out in opposition to the war on drugs. See Finkelman, SUPPI1 note




343 See Swain, supra note 194, at 4. Peter McWilliams has also written a number of works
on individual liberties. See, e.g., PETER MCWILLIAMS, AIN'T NOBODY'S BUSINESS IF You Do:
TIIE ABSURDITY OF CONSENSUAL CRIMES IN A FREE SOCIETY (1993).




 Seeeowati, supra note 341, at 3.
117
 See id.
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there must be a uniquely political reason why the federal government
chose to target McCormick and McWilliams.
Finally, the government's political motivations are clear when
one considers the statements and actions of judges, which are often
anything but models of evenhandedness and judicial restraint. 548
 The
judge in Smith's case serves as one example. Judge Burrell's decision
to deny bail to Smith, considering Smith's lack of a criminal record
and relatively minor violation, suggests that the judge was being less
than evenhanded. 549 Furthermore, the sentence imposed in that
case—the maximum term authorized by law and longer than that re-
quested by the government prosecutors—can be dubbed restraint
only jokingly. 35° Judge Burrell's predilections on the issue of medical
marijuana were evidenced further by his comments on the "evils" of
marijuana. 351 Actions and statements such as these clearly indicate
that Judge Burrell does not take seriously the medical marijuana
claims of gravely ill individuals, and, on the contrary, harbors a nega-
tive predisposition towards medical marijuana defendants such as
Smith.352
Although the evidence that medical marijuana defendants are
prosecuted for political reasons is likely not sufficient to make out a
claim of selective or vindictive prosecution—because of the high-
threshold showing required by the Supreme Courtsm—it nonetheless
serves two important purposes. First, such evidence should act to en-
lighten federal prosecutors that their prosecution of seriously ill indi-
viduals represents an inappropriate exercise of their prosecutorial
discretion.354 More importantly, however, revealing the government's
political motivations in prosecuting medical marijuana defendants
will inform judges and juries, so that they, through defenses like
348 See Ar	 & Garland, supra note 99, at 298 n.11 (quoting WIIII7„ Tensions Between
Politiral Defrndants and the Courts).
349 See Swain, supra note 194, at 7.
35° See Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 222, at 1.
351 See su pm notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
352 See Swain, supra note 194. Even General Barry McCaffery, the Witte House drug
czar, enjoys mocking the pleas of the seriously ill and other supporters of medical mari-
juana: "Ask a doctor if he really wants a big blunt stuck in a patient's face as treatment ....
A lot of this is a crock." Medical Marijuana Called a Crock, MARIJUANA NEWS, Mar. 6, 2000
(visited Mar. 29, 2000) Chttp://216.9.192.67/news.php3?sid=140>.
353 See Armstrong, 514 U.S. 546; liatcheldei; 442 U.S. 114; see also Holton supra note 96, at
507-08.
SerArnolds & Garland, supra note 99, at 299.
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medical necessity, can act as a check on the government's abuse of its
prosecutorial discretion . 355
C. Viability of the Medical Necessity Defense
Because federal prosecutors in most states are not exercising
their prosecutorial discretion appropriately, the courts must retain a
means by which they can exercise their own discretion when the law
. and justice do not coincide. 358
 In the context of criminal prosecutions
involving medical marijuana, the medical necessity defense provides
such a means.357
 Affirming the role of the courts and juries in these
cases, one commentator notes that: "The necessity defense is a 'safety
valve,' fully within our legal tradition, whereby juries may be informed
of their discretionary function as the conscience of the commit-
nity."358
 Similarly, the Supreme Court has stated that: "[O]ne of the
most important functions any jury can perform ... is to maintain a
link between contemporary community values and the penal sys-
tem. "559
It is without question that the medical necessity defense is a valid
defense to prosecution under federal statutory laws° The only re-
maining question, therefore, is whether the medical necessity defense
can be applied in the medical marijuana context. The Ninth Circuit
has resoundingly answered in the affirmative. 381 Indeed, with its deci-
sion in Buyers' Cooperative and its Panel Order in Smith, the Ninth Cir-
cuit correctly cut through the government's misguided belief that,
because marijuana is a Schedule I substance, the medical necessity
355 See Oliver, supra note 281, at 61-63 (referring to jury nullification as check on
prosecutors). Outright jury nullification—where the jury chooses to acquit even when its
factual findings, if applied literally to the law, would have resulted in conviction—is obvi-
ously another alternative. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, SHPra note 266, at 830-31. It is generally
regarded, however, that a judge should not instruct a jury as to its power to nullify a law
because nullification upsets the balance in the courts and erodes citizens' respect for the
law. See id.; Arnolds & Garland, supra note 99, at 299. A legally recognized defense like
medical necessity, therefore, is preferable.
356 See LAFAvE & ISRAEL, SHPra note 266, at 564; Arnolds & Garland, supra note 97, at
299; Oliver, supra note 281, at 61-63.
357 See Deborah Garner, Up in Smoke: The Medicinal Marijuana Debate, 75 N.D. L. REV.
555,585 (1909) (urging expansion of courts' power to accept medical necessity defense);
Whiltort, supra note 99, at 1125-34 (arguing for application of medical necessity defense to
medical marijuana cases in Massachusetts).
358 A1-1101(iS & Garland, supra note 99, at 299; see also Oliver, supra note 281, at 61-63.
359
 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,515 (1968) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958)).
36° See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
3° 1 See Ninth Circuit Order, supra note 234, at I; Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d at 1115.
May 2000]	 Medical Ala 11 a na	 751
defense is not available as a defense to federal prosecution for manu-
facturing or possessing marijuana. 362 In addition to the Ninth Circuit,
other federal circuits have similarly rejected the government's posi-
6°11.363 Furthermore, the basis for the government's argument re-
garding the scheduling law also has been rejected by numerous state
courts that have allowed the medical necessity defense in medical
marijuana cases despite state scheduling laws that are analogous to
the federal government's scheduling law. 364
The federal circuit and state courts that have faced the issues of
medical marijuana and the medical necessity defense have rightly
concluded, implicitly or otherwise, that the attempt to link two unre-
lated concepts—scheduling and medical necessity—is wholly without
merit. Indeed, the government's interest in prohibiting the use of
marijuana generally is not furthered by prohibiting the use of ►ari-
juana in certain exceptional circumstances where it could offer relief
to, for example, a cancer victim suffering from excruciating pain or a
multiple sclerosis victim suffering from continuous spastic contrac-
tions. 365 As discussed above, the doctrine of necessity has been devel-
oped and judicially required throughout the years specifically to
counterbalance legislative pronouncements and leave to courts—
through judges and juries—the discretion to craft a just outcome in a
particular case. 366 To think or reason otherwise, moreover, blatantly ig-
nores the history of the necessity defense and the separation of pow-
ers doctrine upon which this country was founded.
Notwithstanding the government's misguided efforts to reconcile
federal scheduling law with its rejection of the medical necessity de-
fense, it is apparent that the Controlled Substances Act was not in-
tended to prohibit the medical use of marijuana forever. 367 The legis-
lative history surrounding the law's enactment suggests that Congress
did not even consider the medical utility of marijuana in placing mari-
juana in Schedule I, let alone the question of whether it should be
illegal to use a Schedule I substance ill a medical emergency. 368 On
the contrary, Congress intended to place marijuana in Schedule I
362 See id.; see'also Defendant's Memorandum Re Bail, supra note 195, at 6.
363 See supra notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
361 See supra notes 110-30 and accompanying text.
363 See Tale, 505 A.2d at 957 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
366 Arnolds & Garland, supra note 99, at 298; see also Oliver, supra note 281, at 61-63.
367 See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
368 See id.
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only temporarily, pending the outcome of the Commission's report. 36g
For political reasons, however, this report, which concluded that mari-
juana lacked any harmful physiological effects, was never employed
properly to reschedule marijuana. 37°
Federal courts that correctly allow the medical necessity defense
in medical marijuana cases in the future will still face questions re-
garding its application, specifically, how to apply the element requir-
ing that "no other legal and reasonable alternatives" be present. With
regard to this question, the Ninth Circuit's recent holdings wisely lead
the way towards a rational and compassionate rule. 371 In Buyers' Coop-
erative, the Ninth Circuit correctly determined that the concept of
other legal and reasonable alternatives referred to other medications,
not to legislative or executive branch remedies.372 Thus, the adminis-
trative opportunity for rescheduling cannot be used to deny a crimi-
nal defendant the occasion to present a medical necessity defense at
trial. As discussed in Buyers' Club, the rescheduling odyssey experi-
enced by NORML, beginning in 1972 and finally concluding in
1994,373 makes it clear that rescheduling is not a "reasonable" alterna-
tive, especially for a seriously ill individual in need of instant relief.
Therefore, unless the federal government follows the IOM's recom-
mendation and reinstates its IND Program, the government cannot
argue—as some state courts have in denying the defense—that seri-
ously ill individuals for whom marijuana is the only effective treat-
ment have any other legal and reasonable alternative. 374 Thus, a de-
fendant only should be denied the opportunity to present a medical
necessity defense to the judge or jury in cases where the defendant
failed to produce facts, such as a doctor's recommendation, that mari-
juana was necessary to prevent a medical harm.
The success of the medical necessity defense in federal court is
especially crucial for citizens in states without medical marijuana laws.
In these states, the argument urging prosecutorial discretion applies
with less force because there is not a clear indication of the commu-
nity's disposition regarding medical marijuana. 375 Nonetheless, the
369 See
370 See id.
371 SeeNin ill Circuit Order, supra note 234, at 1; &yea' Coop., 190 F.3t1 at 1115.
372 See Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d at 1114.
373 See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
374 See sepia notes 271-86,312 and accompanying text, discussing state courts that have
held that defendant had reasonable legal alternative tinder state law by virtue of a slate
sponsored research program.




medical necessity defense is of great importance in all states as it can
serve as both an important check on local and federal prosecutors
and as a conduit for proclaiming community values. 376 Indeed, if the
medical necessity defense is allowed in medical marijuana cases and
juries overwhelmingly accepts the defense, a strong message will be
sent to prosecutors. Over time, prosecutors hopefully will accept the
will of the people and decline to prosecute such cases in which they
cannot obtain a conviction.
CONCLUSION
America's relationship with marijuana has been extremely tumul-
tuous and political. In this century, marijuana, a substance that has
enjoyed a rich medical history dating back thousands of years, has
been relegated to merely another target in the war on drugs. This war
on drugs has been responsible for thousands of innocent casualties—
seriously ill individuals, suffering from illnesses such as cancer and
AIDS, who cannot receive legally a form of treatment that can relieve
their pain. 377 Consequently, many otherwise law-abiding citizens have
been forced to violate federal law. In many cases, these same individu-
als face criminal prosecution and possible incarceration. The recent
burgeoning of medical marijuana laws in states throughout the coun-
try indicates that Americans will no longer tolerate this inhumane
treatment of the seriously ill.
The federal government should follow the lead of these states
and respect the will of the people by rescheduling marijuana or by
exercising their prosecutorial discretion in a way that formally ends
the prosecution of medical marijuana patients. Additionally, federal
courts throughout the country should follow the Ninth Circuit's lead
in Buyers' Cooperative and Stnith to ensure that the medical necessity
defense is available to all of those defendants having a sufficient
medical need for marijuana. Such a showing of compassion on the
part of the federal government would be consistent with this nation's
notions of fundamental fairness, liberty and justice.
ANDREW J. LEVAY *
576 ,Srt Parry, salmi note 103, at 440 (stating that necessity verdicts advance net social
welfare by reaching result that upholds, advances and renews community values and sig-
nals shifts in those values).
577
 See Finkelnum, SUPM note 335, at 1397.
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